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JURY SELECTION ERRORS ON APPEAL
William T. Pizzi* and Morris B. Hoffman**
I. INTRODUCTION
Claims that errors were made during jury selection are among the most common
of all grounds for criminal appeals Yet appellate courts, both state and federal,
seem profoundly confused about how to analyze these kinds of errors. The
confusion has its roots in a defendant's ability to cure most jury selection errors
with the use of a peremptory challenge, and the resulting question of whether the
price of such a cure-the loss of a peremptory challenge-is itself an injury
requiring reversal.
Consider, for example, two state court cases that reached opposite conclusions
about errors that led to the loss of a defendant's peremptory challenge. The first
case is from Vermont, where John Doleszny was charged with sexual assault on a
victim under sixteen.2 During jury selection, a prospective juror disclosed that he
was acquainted with one of the prosecution witnesses, a doctor who had examined
the alleged victim after the assault. When asked if he could be impartial in
evaluating the testimony of the doctor, the prospective juror replied, "I certainly
could try to be impartial but I'm not saying that I could. ' '3 The prosecution was
unable to rehabilitate this response.4
Despite the prospective juror's inability to assure the trial judge that he could be
impartial, the judge erroneously denied Mr. Doleszny's challenge for cause. Mr.
* B.A. Holy Cross; M.A. University of Massachusetts; J.D. Harvard. Professor of Law and Byron White
Center Fellow, University of Colorado School of Law. I would like to thank my research assistant, Matthew D.
Grove, who was tremendously helpful on the research in this article.
** B.A. University of Colorado; J.D. University of Colorado School of Law. District Judge, State of Colorado,
Second Judicial District (Denver). I would like to thank my law clerks, Catherine A. Woods and Christian H.
Hendrickson, for their invaluable contributions to some of the research in this article. The views I express here are
of course my own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the District Court for the Second Judicial District or
any of my colleagues on that Court.
1. Because virtually all criminal cases are tried to juries, virtually all criminal cases that result in convictions
have the potential to generate a jury selection issue on appeal. Moreover, the rate at which criminal convictions
are appealed is roughly 100%. See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J.
LEGIS. STruD. 379, 421 n.80 (1995). The ubiquity of jury selection issues in appeals is thus not surprising. See JoY
CHAPPER & ROGER HANSON, UNDERSTANDING CRIMNAL APPEALS 32 (1989) (finding jury selection errors the
eighth most common error in criminal appeals).
2. State v. Doleszny, 508 A.2d 693 (Vt. 1986).
3. Id. at 694.
4. At least there is nothing in the opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court indicating the juror was rehabilitated.
Cf. State v. Grega, 721 A.2d 445,481 (Vt. 1992) (noting rehabilitation took place after juror disclosed she knew
and respected physician-witness and would be upset if someone said he did anything wrong, yet later said she
would not hold such criticism against defendant or prosecution and could listen to both sides).
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Doleszny was then forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove the prospective
juror. Since Mr. Doleszny eventually exhausted his peremptory challenges, he was
in effect deprived of one peremptory challenge as a result of the trial judge's
erroneous denial of his challenge for cause.
On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded
for a new trial. Such an error, said the court, is automatic reversible error. There
are many jurisdictions that analyze these kinds of errors the same way: if the
defense lost a peremptory challenge as a result of the judge's error, the conviction
is automatically reversed without further inquiry.6
But other jurisdictions would apply a harmless error analysis to the same error.7
One example is a case from Idaho, where Eric Ramos was charged with two counts
of lewd conduct with minors.8 During jury selection, a prospective juror expressed
5. In the introductory portions of this article, we use the phrase "automatic reversible error" to describe an error
that demands reversal of a criminal conviction without any inquiry into the actual impact of the error on the
reliability of the truth-finding process. As described in greater detail in infra text accompanying notes 139-80,
courts and commentators have used several synonyms to describe this sort of error, including "per se reversible
error" and, most recently, "structural error."
6. See e.g., State v. Sexton, 787 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Arz. 1989) (finding defendant's right to peremptory
challenges "so substantial that forcing a party to use a peremptory challenge to strike potential jurors who should
have been stricken for cause denies the litigant a substantial right"); People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 236
(Colo. 1992) (finding prejudicial error occurred where trial court failed to strike a potential juror who was related
to an attorney of record and defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror); People v.
Scott, 566 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (finding new trial necessary where the trial court erred in
failing to remove a juror for cause and defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges). For the federal courts, the
Supreme Court may have resolved the issue in United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304 (2000), which we
discuss extensively later in this article. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. Before Martinez-Salazar,
several federal circuits held that jury selection error resulting in a defendant's loss of a peremptory challenge was
automatically reversible. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381, 408 (5th Cir. 1998) ("'The denial or
impairment of the right to exercise peremptory challenges is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.'")
(citation omitted); United States v. Cambara, 902 F.2d 144, 148 (1st Cir. 1990) ("[I]t is true that restricting a
defendant's use of the lawful number of peremptory challenges is reversible error if a challenge for cause is
erroneously denied.").
7. See, e.g., Pickens v. State, 783 S.W.2d 341, 345 (Ark. 1990) (finding loss of peremptory challenges not to be
reversible error); People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643, 663 (Cal. 1992) (finding no basis for reversal where defendant
fails to prove the trial court erroneously denied any challenges for cause); State v. Pelletier, 552 A.2d 805, 810
(Conn. 1989) (finding defendant unharmed because he was not forced to accept any juror or alternate whom he
requested to be removed for cause); State v. Barlow, 541 N.W.2d 309, 311-13 (Minn. 1995) ("(Tlhe necessity to
exercise a peremptory challenge to strike a juror whom the trial court has erroneously refused to remove for cause
does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial."); State v. Lindell, 629 N.W.2d 223, 251 (Wis. 2001) overruling State
v. Ramos, 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1997) ("The substantial rights of a party are not affected or impaired when a
defendant chooses to exercise a single peremptory strike to correct a circuit court error."). In the federal courts,
there were several circuits, even before Martinez-Salazar, that applied a harmless error analysis to these kinds of
errors. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1245-46 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding trial court's erroneous
failure to remove a juror for cause harmless error where defendant has not alleged that any of the jurors actually
seated were biased); United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557, 1566 (11 th Cir. 1995) (rejecting "'the notion that the
loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury') (citation
omitted).
8. State v. Ramos, 808 P.2d 1313 (Idaho 1991).
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his belief that the defendant "must have done something" to be on trial.9 As in
Doleszny, the prosecution was unable to rehabilitate this prospective juror."t When
the trial judge refused to remove him for cause, Mr. Ramos used a peremptory
challenge to remove the putative juror and eventually exhausted his peremptory
challenges. 11
Instead of stopping at the cause error itself and simply reversing, the Idaho
Supreme Court examined the impact of the error on Mr. Ramos' trial, specifically,
whether there was anything wrong with the jury that had convicted him. Because
Mr. Ramos removed the biased juror with one of his peremptory challenges and
there was no evidence that the jury that convicted him had not been fair and
impartial, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Ramos had not been
prejudiced by the trial judge's erroneous cause ruling and affirmed the convic-
tion.12
These two cases represent two very different approaches to a very common
problem. While the cases often involve erroneous denials of a defense challenge
for cause, as in Doleszny and Ramos, there are many other situations in which a
variant of the same problem commonly arises. For example, when a trial judge
erroneously grants a prosecution challenge for cause and the prosecution exhausts
all of its peremptory challenges, that error has the effect of giving the prosecution
an additional peremptory challenge. Like Doleszny and Ramos, defendants in such
cases suffer an imbalance in peremptory challenges, although the source of the
imbalance is that the prosecution received more peremptory challenges rather than
that the defendant received fewer. Is such an error automatically reversible, or
could it be harmless?
In this article, we begin by reviewing the Supreme Court's three opinions in the
area of "curative peremptory challenges," including its most recent pronounce-
ment in United States v. Martinez-Salazar.13 We then discuss the historical
relationship between challenges for cause and peremptory challenges, arguing that
peremptory challenges have always had a curative purpose. Drawing on that
history and on the evolution of the doctrine of harmless error, we break down the
types and permutations of these kinds of jury selection errors into six different
9. Actually, three prospective jurors initially expressed the belief that Mr. Ramos must have done something by
virtue of the fact he was on trial. Id. at 1314. Two were excused on defense challenges for cause, but the trial judge
denied the challenge for cause as to the third. Id.
10. Or more precisely, there was no indication in the opinion of any rehabilitation.
11. 808 P.2d. at 1314.
12. As the Idaho Supreme Court put it:
Ramos made no showing in his motion for new trial that he was prejudiced by being required to
use a peremptory challenge to remove [the juror]. Ramos has not demonstrated, nor has he even
suggested, that any of the other jurors remaining on the panel were not impartial or were biased.
Thus, if there was any error, it was harmless.
Id. at 1315.
13. 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
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scenarios.14 We argue that in each of the six scenarios the resulting imbalance in
peremptory challenges should not result in reversals, both because the error is
harmless and, at least in some of the scenarios, because the defendant should be
deemed to have waived the error.'
5
14. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text. In addition to errors in rulings on challenges for cause,
there is of course a second basic kind of jury selection error-error in a trial court's application of Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue, but it has suggested in
various cases, including Batson itself, that Batson error is per se reversible. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S.
254, 263-64 (1986); Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 ("If the trial court decides that the facts establish prima facie
discrimination and the prosecutor does not come forward with a neutral explanation of his actions, our precedents
require that Petitioner's conviction be reversed."). Perhaps because of these strong signals from the Supreme
Court, lower federal courts have uniformly held that Batson error is per se reversible. See, e.g., United States v.
McFerron, 163 E3d 952, 956 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hall, 152 F.3d 381,408 (5th Cir. 1998); Tankleff v.
Senkowski, 135 F3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Underwood, 122 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cit. 1997);
United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132, 1143 (9th Cir. 1996); Ford v. Norris, 67 F3d 162, 170 (8th Cir. 1995);
Ramseur v. Beyer, 983 E2d 1215, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1992).
The state courts, however, are split on this issue. Compare K.S. v. Carr, 618 So.2d 707, 712 (Ala. 1993) and
State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Batson error reversible per se) with Seubert v. State, 749
S.W.2d 585, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (Batson subject to harmless error analysis), rev'd on other grounds, 787
S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1990).
Professor Muller has suggested on the one hand that the Supreme Court's hints about this issue are far from
obvious-for example, in Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255 (1986), the Court held that Batson is not retroactive, in
part because it only has marginal bearing on the truth-finding function in individual cases, compared to its
primary purpose of strengthening public confidence in the system. Eric L. Muller, Solving the Batson Paradox:
Harmless Error Jury Representation, and the Sixth Amendment, 106 YALE L.J. 93, 121-24 (1996). On the other
hand, Professor Muller concludes that the Sixth Amendment implications of a Batson error justify classifying it as
per se reversible. Id. at 97-107, 149-50; see also Susan N. Herman, Why the Court Loves Batson: Representation-
Reinforcement, Colorblindness, and the Jury, 67 TtL. L. REv. 1807 (1993) (arguing that Batson error is not
properly amenable to harmless error analysis because Batson implicates a bundle of rights that go far beyond the
reliability of the outcome in a particular case).
Whether Batson error should be per se reversible or should be subject to harmless error analysis, or indeed
whether Batson itself should be reconsidered, is beyond the scope of this article. But it is important to recognize
that the adoption of a Batson per se rule does not compel a per se rule for the jury selection errors we discuss in
this article. Even if we concede both Professor Muller's point-that Batson in fact protects a defendant's
case-specific right to an impartial jury and therefore has everything to do with the reliability of the case
outcome-and Professor Herman's point-that Batson implicates a wide range of institutional issues going well
beyond the reliability of a particular case-neither observation applies to errors that simply result in a small
imbalance of peremptory challenges. This is so, as discussed below in infra text accompanying notes 217-28,
because the loss of a peremptory challenge, as opposed, arguably, to the discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges, has little to do with the impartiality of juries and therefore little to do with the reliability of trial
outcomes.
15. See infra notes 210-33 and accompanying text. Although the problem of the curative use of peremptory
challenges has been the subject of many judicial opinions in state and federal courts, we have found only one law
review article written on the topic: William G. Childs, The Intersection of Peremptory Challenges, Challenges for
Cause, and Harmless Error, 27 AM. J. CRM. L. 49 (1999). Mr. Childs' article was written while the Court's
decision in Martinez-Salazar was pending, and he urged the Court to hold that the impairment of peremptory
challenges is a per se violation of a criminal defendant's rights to due process, at least in federal courts. Id. at 52,
75-79. Of course, we disagree with Mr. Childs' analysis, and believe that he seriously overvalues the historical
and practical importance of peremptory challenges, undervalues their mischievousness, and ignores the Court's
unmistakable movement toward reliability as the measure of harmlessness.
This article is limited to a discussion of the problem of curative peremptory challenges in criminal cases. But a
similar problem exists in civil cases. Civil litigants, like criminal defendants, are entitled to impartial jurors, to
1394
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II. AN UNCERTAIN SUPREME COURT: THE ABOUT FACE FROM GRAY V.
MISSISSIPPI TO Ross v OKLAHOMA
A. Gray v. Mississippi
The Supreme Court has not tackled the problem of curative peremptory
challenges very often, and on those few occasions when it has addressed the issue
it has not given very clear guidance. Its initial foray was in a 1987 state death
penalty case, Gray v. Mississippi.t6 In that case, the trial judge erroneously
removed a prospective juror for cause on the prosecution's motion.' 7 The
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence, despite
numerous irregularities in the jury selection,"' concluding that any cause error that
peremptory challenges, to the protections of Batson and in general to have their civil jury trials conducted in
accordance with the minimum standards of fairness imbedded in the due process clause. They are also subject to
the doctrines of harmless error and waiver. Indeed, there are a handful of reported cases discussing the problem of
curative peremptory challenges in a civil context, and reaching conflicting conclusions about whether there is
reversible error. Compare Kirk v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 61 F.3d 147, 162 (3rd Cir. 1995) (reversing civil judgment
when litigant forced to expend peremptory challenge to cure trial judge's error in denying challenge for cause)
with Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 66 F.3d 1119, 1123 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming civil judgment despite fact
that litigant forced to expend peremptory challenge to cure trial judge's error in denying challenge for cause). We
limit our inquiry in this article to the criminal side because the problem of the curative use of peremptory
challenges in a criminal case is in many ways more difficult than in a civil case. The notion of harmless error in
civil cases is much broader-that is, more forgiving-than in criminal cases, and more "process" is generally
"due" to a criminal defendant than a civil litigant. As a result, the problem of curative peremptory challenges in a
criminal case presents significantly starker issues about the role of peremptory challenges and the extent to which
their impairment justifies reversing trial outcomes. If, as we argue in this article, criminal convictions should not
be reversed when a defendant's peremptory challenges are impaired by a cause error, then it necessarily follows
that civil judgments should not be reversed in similar circumstances.
16. 481 U.S. 648 (1987).
17. Although the record in Gray was not terribly clear, what was clear is that the beleaguered trial judge
committed a cacophony of jury selection errors at almost every opportunity. During the death qualification of the
jury, four or five of the panel members expressed doubts about whether they could ever impose the death penalty,
and the prosecution challenged these prospective jurors for cause. Id. at 652-54. Under Wainwright v. Witt, 391
U.S. 510 (1968), and Witherspoon v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), the trial judge should have inquired further of
those jurors to determine whether they should in fact have been removed for cause, although there are also hints in
the record that some of them may have been feigning concerns about the death penalty to avoid jury service. Gray,
481 U.S. at 652-53. In any event, neither counsel nor the trial judge pressed these jurors on their views about the
death penalty. Instead, the prosecutor simply used peremptory challenges to remove them. A new prospective
juror was then called into the jury box, whom the prosecutor ultimately decided to strike peremptorily, but by
then, the prosecutor had exhausted his peremptory challenges. The trial judge seemed to accept some
responsibility for the situation, suggesting that he had not excused the earlier prospective jurors for cause because
he had wrongly assumed that the prosecutor had plenty of peremptory challenges left. Id. In an apparent effort to
undo the damage of his earlier failures, the judge struck the juror in question for cause, even though her answers
were not a sufficient basis for a challenge for cause under Witherspoon-Witt. Id. at 654-55.
18. The trial judge's performance in Gray is a good advertisement for the superiority of the so-called "strike"
method of exercising peremptory challenges over the so-called "sequential" or "jury box" method. Under the
"strike" method, prospective jurors are called to an expanded box equal in number to the number of all regular
jurors, alternates and total peremptory challenges. These prospective jurors are then examined, and challenges for
cause are made and ruled upon. If a challenged juror is removed for cause, a replacement is called up to the
expanded box, questioned and challenged for cause if appropriate. Only after all the jurors in the expanded box
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may have resulted in an unwarranted increase in the number of prosecution
peremptory challenges was harmless.' 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the prosecution's harmless
error argument. Although the prosecution insisted that it would have peremptorily
struck the last prospective juror if it had had any peremptory challenges left, the
Court noted that the timing of a trial judge's error in a particular case could very
well affect the prosecution's complex strategic decisions about when and on whom
to expend its remaining peremptory challenges. 20 The Court concluded that the
"unexercised peremptory argument" that underlay the prosecution's harmless error
contention mischaracterized the nature of the error. It framed the question as being
not whether a cause error resulted in the erroneous exclusion of a particular
prospective juror, but rather whether "the composition of the jury panel as a whole
could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error. t2 1 It concluded that it
could not say that the cause errors suffered by Mr. Gray could not have "possibly"
affected the composition of the jury as a whole, and it therefore held that the error
was automatically reversible.22 Interestingly, the Court reversed only Mr. Gray's
death sentence, not his conviction.
Gray seemed like powerful support for the notion that virtually all jury selection
errors should be automatically reversed. If the Court will reverse any conviction
where the composition of the jury panel "could possibly have been affected by the
trial court's error,' 23 then there is a far stronger argument for automatic reversal in
cases like Doleszny and Ramos, where there is no doubt that the composition of the
actual juries would have been different had the defense not lost a peremptory
challenge due to the trial judge's cause error.
Gray was a strong opinion, but the Court was badly split. Four dissenters argued
that the problem jurors should have been excluded in any event, and thus that the
have survived challenges for cause do the parties then exercise their peremptory challenges. By contrast, under
the "sequential" or "jury box" method, only enough jurors are called to the box to accommodate the number of
regular jurors and alternates. These jurors are then questioned, challenged for cause and then peremptorily
challenged, juror-by-juror. That is, if a prospective juror survives challenges for cause, the parties must then
decide whether to accept that prospective juror or exercise a peremptory challenge. For a good description of
these two methods see Brent J. Gurney, The Case for Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21
HARV. CRIM. & CONST. L. REv. 227, 244-56 (1986) and Leonard B. Sand, Batson and Jury Selection Revisited, 22
LMG. 3, 3-4 (1996). The errors in Gray, of course, were profoundly compounded because the trial judge used the
traditional "sequential" method for peremptory challenges, hopelessly and seamlessly interlacing his decisions on
challenges for cause with the parties' exercise of peremptory challenges.
19. Gray v. State, 472 So.2d 409, 423 (Miss. 1985). The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision was even less
clear than the trial court record. The United States Supreme Court was forced to engage in the rather remarkable
exercise of guessing the basis for the Mississippi Supreme Court's decision. The Court divined that the
Mississippi Supreme Court's opinion was susceptible to three very different interpretations, and proceeded to
address each of them. 481 U.S. at 661-62.
20. 481 U.S. at 661-62.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 668.
23. Id. at 665.
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error would not have affected the composition of the jury even under the majority's
expansive recognition of systemic jury selection errors and its low "possibility"
threshold.24 Perhaps because the Court was so deeply divided, it undertook the
rather remarkable step of reexamining the issue less than a year later, in Ross v.
Oklahoma.
B. Ross v. Oklahoma
Ross was another death penalty case. Unlike in Gray, however, where the
imbalance in peremptory challenges was the result of the trial judge erroneously
excluding qualified jurors, the peremptory imbalance in Ross arose from the trial
judge erroneously failing to exclude a disqualified juror. Specifically, the trial
judge in Ross failed to apply Witherspoon-Witt to excuse a prospective juror who
expressed disqualifying pro-death penalty views. The prospective juror in question
indicated during voir dire that if the jury found the defendant guilty he would
automatically vote to impose the death penalty regardless of any mitigating
factors.26 This sort of reverse Witherspoon-Witt attitude entitled the defense to
remove the prospective juror for cause.2 7 When the trial court erroneously denied
Mr. Ross's challenge for cause, he was forced to use one of his peremptory
challenges to remove the pro-death penalty juror. He eventually exhausted his
peremptory challenges. Thus, as in Doleszny and Ramos, the effect of this error
was that the defense ended up with one fewer peremptory challenge than
guaranteed by state law.
2 8
The dissenters in Gray, now a majority with the loss of Justice Powell and the
addition of Justice Kennedy, declined to apply Gray's automatic reversal rule.
Instead, the Court announced that "the broad language used by the Gray Court is
too sweeping to be applied literally, and is best understood in the context of the
facts there involved." 29 Gray, said the new Ross majority, must be limited to its
context and applied only to the erroneous exclusion of a qualified juror in a capital
case, not to the erroneous inclusion of a disqualified juror in a capital case who is
later peremptorily excused.30
Freed from the automatic reversal rule of Gray, the Ross Court proceeded to
fashion a rather startling syllogism to conclude that Mr. Ross suffered no error at
24. Id. at 672-80 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White and O'Connor, JJ.).
25. 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
26. Id. at 83-84
27. Most courts applied Witherspoon-Witt symmetrically, to disqualify not only inappropriately adamant
anti-death penalty jurors but also inappropriately adamant pro-death penalty jurors. The Court formally adopted
this view in Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992).
28. Under Oklahoma law, a capital defendant like Mr. Ross was entitled to nine peremptory challenges. OKLA.
STAT. fit. 22, § 655 (1981).
29. 487 U.S. at 87-88.
30. Id.
2001] 1397
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all, let alone reversible error. It began by noting that under Oklahoma law, as in
virtually all other states, 31 a defendant waives the right to argue that a trial judge
erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause if the defendant fails to use an
available peremptory challenge to remove the erroneously retained juror.32 From
this waiver rule, the Court reasoned that Oklahoma intended that the nine
peremptory challenges it chose to give capital criminal defendants necessarily
include any peremptory challenges that a defendant might have to use curatively.
33
Thus, it concluded that Mr. Ross "received all [the peremptory challenges] that
Oklahoma law allowed him,",34 and therefore that there was no error at all in the
manner Mr. Ross's jury was selected, let alone reversible error.
The four-justice remnant of the Gray majority filed a vociferous dissent in Ross,
accusing the majority of "unaccountably" departing from the one-year precedent
of Gray.35 It argued that Mr. Ross suffered an even more direct injury to his "right"
to peremptory challenges than did Mr. Gray. The imbalance in peremptory
challenges in Ross was caused by Mr. Ross being forced to expend one of his
peremptory challenges to cure the trial judge's erroneous denial of his challenge
for cause; the imbalance in Gray was caused by the arguably much less significant
decision by the trial court to grant, erroneously, several prosecution challenges for
cause. If Mr. Gray was deprived of due process because the prosecution in his case
in effect received a few more peremptory challenges than allowed by law, surely
Mr. Gray was deprived of exactly the same due process when he was forced to use
a peremptory challenge on a prospective juror who should have been excused for
cause.
Gray and Ross were decided according to state jury selection procedures. In a
footnote, the Ross majority specifically left open the question of whether Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b), like its Oklahoma counterpart, requires peremp-
tory challenges to be used curatively and therefore whether the Ross "no error"
analysis will apply to federal cases.36 Of course, Gray and Ross were also both
death penalty cases, raising the issue of whether they should be limited to the
unique jury selection challenges presented in capital cases. 37 The Court addressed
these unresolved issues twelve years later, in United States v. Martinez-Salazar. 38
31. See infra note 222.
32. See 487 U.S. at 89-90 (citing McDonald v. State, 15 P.2d 1092, 1094 (Okla. 1937); Stott v. State, 538 P.2d
1061, 1064-65 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); and Ferrell v. State, 475 P.2d 825, 828 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970)).
33. 487 U.S. at 90-91.
34. Id. at 91.
35. Id. at 92-98 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
36. Id. at 91 n.4.
37. See, e.g., Karen T. Grisez, Ross v. Oklahoma: A Reversal of the Reversible Error Standard in Death-
Qualification Cases, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 881 (1989) (analyzing both cases as death penalty cases and not as
applying to jury selection errors generally).
38. 528 U.S. 304 (2000).
[Vol. 38:13911398
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Iii. UNITED STATES V. MARTINEZ-SALIZAR
A. The Jury Selection Error
Abel Martinez-Salazar and a co-defendant were indicted in the United States
District Court for the District of Arizona on charges of conspiracy to sell heroin,
drug trafficking in heroin, and carrying a firearm in the course of the drug
trafficking. 39 As in Ross and as in our examples, Doleszny and Ramos, the jury
selection error that took Martinez-Salazar to the Supreme Court began with the
failure of the trial judge to remove a prospective juror for cause. In response to a
question on a jury questionnaire asking if he knew of anything that might affect his
ability to be impartial, the prospective juror wrote, "I would favor the prosecu-
tion."40 When the venire was brought into court, the trial judge asked the
prospective juror several questions about his response on the questionnaire. Most
of the replies were somewhat ambiguous.4 But at one point in the course of his
39. From what we can glean from the Ninth Circuit opinion, 146 R3d 653 (9th Cir. 1999), the case appears to
have been a rather routine drug case with very strong evidence against both defendants. Other than the jury
selection issue that went to the Supreme Court, the only other issue discussed in the Ninth Circuit opinion was Mr.
Martinez-Salazar's contention that there was not enough evidence to convict him of the gun charge. The Ninth
Circuit summarily rejected this contention because the gun in question was found under the front passenger seat
next to the heroin, Mr. Martinez-Salazar had been seated in that seat, and Mr. Martinez-Salazar admitted to a drug
agent that the gun was always in the car. Id. at 654.
40. Id. at 655.
41. The transcript of the inquiry into the juror's bias reads as follows:
THE COURT: On your questionnaire, you said in question number eight, the answer: "I would
favor the prosecution." Is that-are you saying that you would not be able to listen to the evidence,
and decide what happened, and follow the instructions of the Court, but would simply vote for a
conviction because people are charged with drug crimes?
JUROR: No. I think what I'm saying is all things being equal, I would probably tend to favor the
prosecution.
THE COURT: You understand that one of the things the jury will be told, of course, is that the
prosecution, the Government has the burden of proving someone guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. And I suppose realistically, all things being equal wouldn't be beyond a reasonable doubt.
Would you disagree with that?
JUROR: No, I guess I wouldn't disagree with that.
THE COURT: I guess the important question is-and perhaps let me ask it this way. It's kind of
my question. But if you were the defendants here charged with this crime, and all of the jurors on
your case had your background and your opinions, do you think you'd get a fair trial?
JUROR: I think that's a difficult question. I don't think I know the answer to that.
Martinez-Salazar's trial counsel, Mr. Garcia, then followed up by questioning the juror:
MR. GARCIA: If you were to error [sic], where would you feel more comfortable erring, in
favor of the prosecutor or the defendant?
JUROR: Well, again, not having heard any evidence in the case, I think that's kind of hard to say.
I think, as I indicated on here, I would probably be more favorable to the prosecution. I suppose
most people are. I mean they're predisposed. You assume that people are on trial because they did
something wrong.
THE COURT: Well, you see, you heard me out there when I started the trial. That's not the
general proposition. If it is, it's wrong. It's contrary to our whole system of justice. When people
are accused of a crime, there's no presumption-
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colloquy with the judge the prospective juror said, "I think what I am saying is all
things being equal, I would probably tend to favor the prosecution. 42
Mr. Martinez-Salazar and his co-defendant challenged the prospective juror for
cause, but the trial judge erroneously denied the challenge.43 The defendants then
used one of their eleven shared peremptory challenges to strike the juror, and later
exhausted all of their peremptory challenges. 44 Thus, as in Ross, the impact of the
trial judge's error was that the defense had one fewer peremptory challenge than it
JUROR: There's a-
THE COURT:-of guilty. The presumption is the other way. That's the way our system-
JUROR: I understand that in theory.
THE COURT: Okay, all right, all right. Why don't you wait, and we'll be done here in a few
minutes, okay? Thank you very much.
Id.
42. Id.
43. The Ninth Circuit concluded that trial judge erred when he denied the defendants' challenge of the subject
juror for cause:
The district court here should have excused [the juror] for cause because he did not and would not
affirmatively state that he could lay aside his admitted bias in favor of the prosecution. [The juror]
clearly acknowledged this bias, even after being instructed by the district court that it was
"contrary to our whole system of justice." He never retreated from his statement of bias.
Id. at 656. In its arguments in the Supreme Court, the government did not contest the Ninth Circuit's conclusion
that the trial court erred in denying the defendants' challenge for cause to this juror. 528 U.S. at 309.
44. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(b), a defendant charged with a non-capital felony is entitled
to ten peremptory challenges and the prosecution six. FED. R. CRtm. P. 24(b); see infra notes 122-23 and
accompanying text. The rule explicitly states that co-defendants must share these ten peremptory challenges, but
also provides that in the case of multiple defendants the trial court "may" allow additional peremptory challenges
and/or direct that they be exercised separately. Trial judges have great discretion in deciding whether to award
co-defendants additional peremptory challenges. See, e.g., United States v. Magana, 118 F.3d 1173, 1206 (7th Cir.
1997); State v. Cambara, 902 F.2d 144, 147-48 (1st Cir. 1990). Moreover, Rule 24(c) provides that a defendant
shall have an additional peremptory challenge if up to two alternate jurors are to be seated. FED. R. CRAM. P. 24(c).
In Martinez-Salazar, one alternate juror was seated, so the two co-defendants had a presumptive eleven
peremptory challenges between them. Moreover, the trial judge awarded no additional peremptory challenges,
nor did he allocate the eleven peremptory challenges between the defendants. Thus, the two co-defendants were
required jointly to exercise their total allotment of eleven peremptory challenges.
There are serious complications to the already daunting problem of curative peremptory challenges when
multiple defendants are tried together and forced to exercise their peremptory challenges jointly, particularly
when the trial court does not award them any additional peremptory challenges. The fundamental difficulty is that
such defendants have an independent, constitutionally-based, right to challenge jurors for cause, but must share
their now paltry per capita peremptory challenges. For example, how do we apply the Ross/Martinez-Salazar "no
error" rule when one defendant, but not the other, challenges a prospective juror for cause, but both suffer when
the trial court erroneously denies the challenge and must then exercise one of their precious joint-peremptory
challenges to cure the error? Of course, this problem, and a host of other problems caused by forcing defendants to
share peremptory challenges, can be greatly reduced and even eliminated by giving multiple defendants
additional peremptory challenges and allowing the defendants to exercise the challenges separately. But of course
the award of too many additional defense-peremptory challenges may at some point become fundamentally unfair
to the prosecution. Giving Mr. Martinez-Salazar and his co-defendant eleven additional peremptory challenges,
and allowing them each to exercise eleven separately, restores them to the position they would have been in had
they been tried separately. But of course it also means that in the aggregate the defendants will now have
twenty-two peremptory challenges to the prosecution's six. We are unaware of any cases or commentaries
discussing the problem of joint-peremptory challenges, but a good argument can be made that the number of
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would otherwise have had.45 Both defendants were convicted, and Mr. Martinez-
Salazar appealed, arguing both a general insufficiency of evidence and the trial
court's erroneous refusal to grant the challenge for cause.46
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction. It agreed with the prosecution that
under Ross there was no Sixth Amendment violation, since the jury that convicted
Mr. Martinez-Salazar was fair and impartial.47 Nevertheless it reversed the
conviction, concluding that the impairment of Mr. Martinez-Salazar's right to a
full complement of peremptory challenges denied him due process.4 8
B. The Supreme Court's Strained Analysis
The federal circuits were split on the issue of whether a curative loss of a
peremptory challenge was reversible.49 By granting certiorari in Martinez-Salazar,
the Court had an opportunity not only to resolve this split among the circuits, but
also to address the two more general questions left open by Ross-whether Federal
Rule 24(b) requires peremptory challenges to be used curatively and whether the
principles in Gray/Ross have any application at all in non-capital cases. It was also
an opportunity to provide much-needed guidance for state courts, which were
likewise deeply divided on the question of how to analyze these kinds of jury
selection errors. 50
The government argued that the Court should read Federal Rule 24(b) as
requiring the curative use of peremptory challenges, and that under such a reading
the Ross syllogism would be dispositive. But the Court refused to take that
approach. In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, in which five other Justices
joined and the three others specially concurred, the Court held that Federal Rule
additional and/or separately exercised peremptory challenges should reflect in some rough fashion the extent to
which the defendants' substantive and tactical interests may diverge.
45. See supra text accompanying note 28.
46. Interestingly, Mr. Martinez-Salazar's initial court-appointed appellate counsel filed a so-called Anders
brief on the jury selection error, indicating that he could not make the argument in good faith, presumably because
of Ross. 146 F.3d at 655-56. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (allowing court-appointed
counsel to inform an appeals court that a defendant's appeal is frivolous and move to withdraw). The Ninth Circuit
rejected the inference that Ross governed, ordered supplemental briefs and appointed new appellate counsel. 146
F.3d at 656.
47. 146 F.3d at 657.
48. As the Ninth Circuit noted:
Martinez-Salazar's case presents the question Ross left open. Martinez-Salazar was entitled to and
received eleven peremptory challenges, and federal law does not require a defendant to expend a
peremptory challenge in order to cure an erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause. Furthermore,
Martinez-Salazar and his co-defendant exhausted his [sic] eleven peremptory challenges and had
to use one of them to strike [the erroneously retained juror]. Under these circumstances, we hold
that Martinez-Salazar's Fifth Amendment due process rights were violated.
Id. at 658 (footnote omitted).
49. See supra notes 6-7.
50. Id.
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24(b), unlike its Oklahoma counterpart, does not mandate that peremptory chal-
lenges be used curatively. 5I Thus, it concluded that Mr. Martinez-Salazar, unlike
Mr. Ross, was in fact entitled to the full federal compliment of eleven peremptory
challenges.
But the Court then turned that entitlement on its head, by reasoning that
precisely because Mr. Martinez-Salazar was not forced to use any peremptory
challenges curatively, he could not complain about his voluntary election to do so.
He was entitled to, and received, all of his peremptory challenges, so there was no
error.5 2 Although the Court acknowledged that the trial judge had put the
defendants in a difficult position by erroneously denying their challenge for cause,
the Court reasoned that the defendants had a choice at that point of whether or not
to remove the biased juror peremptorily. The defendants, according to the Court,
"had the option of letting [the juror] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction,
pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal."53 Unattractive as this would
have been, the Court opined, "[a] hard choice is not the same as no choice. 54
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, objected to
the majority's assertion that Mr. Martinez-Salazar's lawyer could have allowed the
biased juror to remain and then appealed the conviction. Besides pointing out that
this issue was not before the Court, Justice Scalia argued that "normal principles of
waiver.., disable a defendant from objecting on appeal to the seating of a juror he
was entirely able to prevent." 55 Justice Scalia also suggested that "it may well be
regarded as one of the very purposes of peremptory challenges to enable the
51. 528 U.S. at 315 (citations omitted):
The Government urges us to reverse the Court of Appeals judgment on the ground that federal law,
like the Oklahoma statute in Ross, should be read to require a defendant to use a peremptory
challenge to strike a juror who should have been removed for cause, in order to preserve the claim
that the for-cause ruling impaired the defendant's right to a fair trial .... To date, this Court has
recognized only one substantive control over a federal criminal defendant's choice of whom to
challenge peremptorily. We decline to read into Rule 24, or otherwise impose, the further control
advanced by the Government.
It is rather perplexing that the Court would fix onto the peremptoriness of peremptory challenges to explain
why Federal Rule 24(b) should not be read to require the curative use of peremptory challenges. A curative
requirement, like the state law requirement the Court was more than willing to accept in Ross, is not a "substantive
control" over a defendant's choice of peremptory challenges. It is instead a straightforward application of waiver.
See infra text accompanying notes 182-201. A defendant is still free to use or not use a peremptory challenge
curatively; he or she is simply not free to make that choice without consequences. A hard choice is indeed still a
choice.
52. 528 U.S. 315-16.
53. Id. at315.
54. I lJustice Souter wrote a one paragraph concurring opinion, observing that Mr. Martinez-Salazar never
asked for additional peremptory challenges. Justice Souter wrote separately to emphasize that the case did not
present the question of whether it would have been reversible error for the trial court to refuse such a request for
additional peremptories. Id. at 317 (Souter, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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defendant to correct judicial error on [juror-bias questions]." 56 In the next section
on the history of peremptory challenges and their relationship to challenges for
cause, we will show that Justice Scalia's suggestion is indeed correct.57
C. The Court's Fear of Harmless Error
What is striking about the Ginsburg and Scalia opinions in Martinez-Salazar is
the extent to which they strain, in their own ways, to avoid reaching the harmless
error issue that we contend is at the heart of the problem of curative peremptory
challenges. In doing so, both stretch themselves into some very difficult contor-
tions.58
Justice Scalia concurs in the majority's flawed "no error" syllogism, yet chides
the majority for reaching the waiver issue. But the majority's "no error" conclusion
is entirely dependent on its "no waiver" conclusion. It is only after the majority
interprets Federal Rule 24(b) as not requiring the curative use of peremptory
challenges that it can engage in the fiction that Mr. Martinez-Salazar was not
"forced" to expend a peremptory challenge to cure the cause error, and that "a hard
choice is not the same as no choice."
The majority opinion is more problematical. By holding that a criminal
defendant is not required to cure cause errors with peremptory challenges, the
majority turns well-settled principles of waiver upside down. A fundamental tenet
of judicial review is the "contemporaneous objection rule," under which a lawyer
must object to all trial errors during trial, other than those few denominated as
"plain" errors, in order to preserve the errors on appeal.59 What is different about
peremptory challenges, of course, is that the defense has at its disposal an
56. Id. at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring).
57. See infra text accompanying notes 67-136.
58. Justice Souter's opinion also does some stretching. His suggestion that the outcome of the case might have
been different had Mr. Martinez-Salazar requested additional peremptory challenges seems sensible at first blush,
but it ignores the practical realities of jury selection. [fa trial judge erroneously denies a defendant's challenge for
cause, how likely is it, in the fast-paced and pressurized world of jury selection, that that same judge will later
realize the mistake, before jury selection is over, and give the defendant an extra peremptory? If we can agree that
such a scenario is unlikely, what sense does it make to require a defendant to request additional peremptory
challenges? More importantly, how is it more of a violation of due process for defendants to be denied an
additional peremptory challenge-when the rule is clear that the award of extra peremptory challenges is entirely
within the trial judge's discretion, see supra note 45, and less of a violation of due process for defendants to be
deprived of a peremptory challenge to which they are entitled by rule or statute? And perhaps most fundamentally
of all, why would the proper remedy be to award an additional peremptory challenge rather than simply to reverse
the ruling on the challenge for cause and excuse the juror for cause? Remember, in the Ross/Martinez-Salazar
situation, the error is the erroneous denial of the defendant's challenge for cause. The trial judge can correct that
error at any time during jury selection simply by reconsidering the challenge, granting it, and then removing the
juror in question. There is therefore no need to award an extra peremptory challenge.
Justice Souter's observation that Mr. Martinez-Salazar "did not object to any juror who sat," Martinez-Salazar,
528 U.S. at 318, is a non-sequitur. By definition, defendants in the Ross/Martinez-Salazar predicament never have
an objection to the sitting jurors, all of whom were passed for cause.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 182-202.
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independent mechanism to correct an erroneous failure to remove ajuror for cause.
Yet the Martinez-Salazar Court suggests that a defendant can elect not to cure the
cause error and nevertheless raise it on appeal. As Justice Scalia points out, such a
suggestion is inimical to the contemporaneous objection rule and the axiom of
waiver upon which it is built:
The difficult question ... is not whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
24(b) requires exercise of the peremptory, but rather whether normal principles
of waiver (not to say the even more fundamental principle of volenti non fit
injuria) disable a defendant from objecting on appeal to the seating of a juror
he was entirely able to prevent.
60
The Martinez-Salazar Court's refusal to read basic and well-settled notions of
waiver into Rule 24(b) was particularly mysterious because it led the Court to
engage in a troubling line of reasoning about the role of defense counsel. We
cannot imagine a circumstance in which a competent defense lawyer could
ethically, or would practically, decide to infect his client's jury with a demonstra-
bly biased juror who could have been removed with an available peremptory
challenge. Imagine the logic of such a decision: "I think I'll keep that Klansman on
the jury, who said in open court that he could not be fair to my black defendant,
because I want to keep my peremptory challenges available so I can strike all
Tauruses, who are well known to be pro-prosecution." No competent defense
lawyer would ever trade away the opportunity to excuse a demonstrably biased
juror for the chance to peremptorily excuse jurors he or she has an inarticulable
hunch might be biased.
Moreover, as a practical matter, how often will a defense lawyer be so sure of
the righteousness of his challenge for cause that he will gamble everything on a
reversal based on that challenge? As the majority itself points out in Martinez-
Salazar: "Challenges for cause and rulings upon them... are fast paced, made on
the spot and under pressure. Counsel as well as court, in that setting, must be
prepared to decide, often between shades of gray, 'by the minute."'
61
Precisely because black shades into gray, and because "obvious" challenges for
cause are seldom obvious, it would be a rare defense lawyer indeed who would
gamble his client's fate, and his own license to practice, on a subsequent appeal
attacking the bias of a juror, when the lawyer had a chance to remove that very
juror with a peremptory challenge. In one of the first federal circuit cases to discuss
this aspect of Martinez-Salazar, the Seventh Circuit predicted that "prudent
60. 528 U.S. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring). "Volenti non fit injuria" means "no wrong is done to one who
consents," and is a well-recognized maxim of English common law that developed into the modern tort notion of
assumption of the risk. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A cmt. b, § 892A cmt. a (1979); BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990); see also Charles Warren, Volenti Non Fit lnjuria in Actions in Negligence, 8
HARv. L. REv. 457, 459 (1895).
61. 528 U.S. at 316.
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defense counsel will continue to use peremptory challenges to protect their clients
against potentially biased jurors, rather than gambling everything on their ability to
show bias after-the-fact and to obtain a reversal of a conviction on this basis."62
The lawyer's choice in this situation is not "a hard choice" at all; it is a very easy
choice. Competent representation demands that the defense lawyer correct the trial
judge's error by removing the biased juror peremptorily, unless of course it is the
defense lawyer's intention to inject error into the case.63
This brings us to the second, and perhaps even more troubling, ethical aspect of
the Court's no-waiver conclusion. It invites defense lawyers, facing overwhelming
evidence of their clients' guilt and therefore little reason to believe that even an
impartial jury will do anything but convict, to intentionally infect the jury with a
biased juror whenever a trial court erroneously fails to remove that biased juror for
cause, thus ensuring a reversal on appeal. Accepting such a strange invitation
violates ethical duties that even criminal defense lawyers owe to the integrity of
the judicial system.6 4
Quite apart from these ethical issues, the majority opinion in Martinez-Salazar
leaves the interplay between waiver and error in an eerie state of meaninglessness.
If a defendant is required to use a peremptory challenge curatively, then under Ross
62. United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir. 2000). The Seventh Circuit was also the source of a
strange recent case in which the court reversed convictions where the prosecution was allowed to "save" a
peremptory challenge and use it mid-trial. See United States v. Harbin, 250 F.3d 523 (7th Cir. 2001).
63. See, e.g., MODEL RUL.ES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R, 1.1 (2001): "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." But cf Arnold v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 964, 971 (5th
Cir. 1975) (holding that failure to use reasonable diligence with regard to jury challenges is not a priori
ineffective).
64. For a defense lawyer to permit a trial to take place which the lawyer knows to be fatally flawed due to the
presence of a juror biased against the defendant, whom the lawyer could have removed, raises the issue of what a
trial lawyer's obligation is to the administration of justice.
The ABA Model Rules do not contain a specific acknowledgment that a criminal defense lawyer has an
obligation to the administration of justice. But one can infer such an obligation from rules such as those that
require all lawyers to be candid with the trial judge about adverse controlling legal authority, see MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2001) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority
in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client."), as well as
rules which condemn specific actions by a lawyer that are prejudicial to the administration of justice, see, e.g. R.
3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly make a materially false statement of fact or law to a tribunal."); id. R.
3.5(l)(c) ("A lawyer shall not.., engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.").
One can always draw support for such an obligation from English ethics rules which state that a barrister should
not engage in conduct that is "prejudicial to the administration of justice," see CODE OF CONDUCT OF ENG. AND
WALES, para. 301(a)(ii) (7th ed. 2000) reprinted in ARcHBOLD'S CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE, at
289 (P.J. Richardson ed., 49th ed., & 3d Supp. 2001), or conduct that "is likely to diminish public confidence in
the legal profession or the administration of justice." Id. The same ethical standards state that a barrister must
"take all reasonable and practicable steps to avoid unnecessary expense or waste of the Court's time." Id. para.
70 1(a).
Against this background, it seems hard to allow that it would be ethical and competent representation for an
American lawyer to allow a trial to take place that the lawyer knows violates a fundament right of the defendant
when the lawyer has the power through a defense peremptory to cure the error and assure that the trial is fair.
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there is no error. If a defendant is not required to use peremptory challenges
curatively, then under Martinez-Salazar there is likewise no error. As discussed
below, we think these two tortured syllogisms, when put together, actually mean
that errors of this kind are harmless, but that the Court is unwilling to analyze them
under that standard for fear of what such an analysis will say about the whole role
of peremptory challenges in the truth-finding process.
65
It appears that the Court's logic has not impressed some state appellate courts
that have already rejected the Martinez-Salazar approach and have indicated that
they will continue to view the loss of a peremptory challenge as per se reversible
error under their state constitutions.66 Perhaps the split among state courts would
have remained in any case, but the Court has provided weak guidance even for
federal courts on the proper analysis to be applied when these sorts of jury
selection errors occur.
Why did the Ross and Martinez-Salazar Courts struggle so mightily to avoid the
harmless error issue? In some ways, the Court's failure to face the issue directly is
puzzling. In other ways, it is typical of the ambivalence many English and
American courts have expressed about the peremptory challenge for centuries.
IV. THE HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHALLENGES FOR CAUSE AND
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
The problem of curative peremptory challenges addressed in Martinez-Salazar
raises issues that lie at the heart of the relationship between the challenge for cause
and the peremptory challenge. These two kinds of challenges compliment one
another in a rather complex fashion, and their complimentary nature is the product
of a long and often misunderstood history.
A. Challenges for Cause
From the very beginnings of the English jury in the late 1 100s and early 1200s,
prospective jurors could be challenged for cause, though there were only three
recognized challenges: being related to the defendant by blood, marriage or
economic interest.67 There was no generic challenge for lack of impartiality.
68
Indeed, English jurors before the fifteenth century, like ancient jurors in Greece
65. See infra text accompanying notes 234-47.
66. See State v. Martinez, 999 P.2d 795, 803 (Ariz. 2000) (refusing to follow Martinez-Salazar); People v.
Lefebre, 5 P.3d 295, 307-04 (Colo. 2000) (same); Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 11 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001)
(same); Brown v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E.2d 4, 8-9 n.2 (Va. Ct. App. 2000) (same); State v. Fire, 998 P.2d 362,
364-65 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (same).
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and Rome, did not have to be impartial. These ancient and medieval juries
typically were "presentment" juries, whose functions were investigatory and
accusatory, not decisional.69 Once the presentment juries accused a defendant of a
crime, they turned him or her over to the ruler for trial and punishment.7 °
Presentment jurors were often selected precisely because they may have had
personal knowledge of the alleged crime, or, more commonly, personal knowledge
of the accused or of the alleged victim. Thus, the early English challenge for cause
was quite narrow, and bore little resemblance to our modern challenge for cause
grounded on a lack of juror impartiality.
71
As the presentment jury began to evolve into the trial jury, and as jurors were
called upon not merely to make accusations but also to determine ultimate guilt,
the concept of jurors-as-witnesses began to be replaced with the concept of
jurors-as-independent-fact-finders. By the end of the fifteenth century, the notion
69. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 14 (2d ed. 1988). Ancient
presentment juries were usually quite large, so large that one suspects the procedure was more like a referendum
than a modem trial. Greek presentment juries commonly contained from 100 to 1,500 members, no small
administrative feat in any era. JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL By JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND
FACT § 6 (1986). Early English presentment juries could also be quite large; there is evidence of some thirteenth
century juries containing as many as sixty-six jurors. MOORE, supra, at 41.
In Europe at the time of the Conquest, trial by ordeal remained the preferred method of ultimate truth-finding in
serious criminal (that is, capital) cases. PROFFATr, supra, § 28. Less serious criminal charges were resolved by
compurgation. See infra note 71. Presentment juries, even in felony cases, were exceedingly rare. THOMAS A.
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 11 (1985).
Two events catapulted the jury trial into the forefront of medieval English use. In 1166, Henry H proclaimed the
Assize of Clarendon, which established a uniform national system of juries, called "assizes," to resolve real
property disputes, and which also banned trial by compurgation for most felonies and required that they be tried
by ordeal. See MOORE, supra, at 37-40. In 1215, Pope Innocent I banned the ordeal. Because neither
compurgation nor ordeal was any longer available for serious offenses, trial by jury became the accepted felony
trial method by default. The transformation was rapid. By 1220, just five years after the ordeal was banned, trial
by jury had become the primary method for determining a defendant's guilt in serious criminal cases. GREEN,
supra, at 3. Presentment juries continued their investigative and accusatory roles, but the accused defendants were
now turned over to petit juries for trial rather than to the Church for the ordeal. Typically, but not always, the petit
jury was a composed of some smaller subset of the same presentment jury that had done the investigation and
made the accusation. Id. at 13-15; MOORE, supra, at 39. In fact, the need to reduce the size of the presentment jury
may represent the true historical headwaters of the idea of the peremptory challenge. See infra text accompanying
note 100. Over time, the two kinds of juries-presentment and trial-became more and more distinct. By the
beginning of the fourteenth century, the break between them was complete. GREEN, supra, at 15-16.
70. MOORE, supra note 69, at 14.
71. The early English jury trial was an evolving hodge-podge of older forms of trial, including trial by
compurgation (also called "the wager of law"), in which the accused was acquitted simply by producing a
sufficient number and quality of men to swear to the truth of his oath of innocence. See generally 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *341-44; ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY §§ 43-44, at 34-36 (2d ed.
1930). The role of medieval jurors as witnesses, rather than as impartial finders of fact, was a remnant of the
compurgative notion that an oath-taker's (both the accused's and his compurgators') fear of eternal damnation
was the best method of discovering truth. See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective:
The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2638-68 (1996) (discussing the ecclesiastical significance of
the oath in the development of the privilege against self-incrimination).
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that jurors had to be impartial was firmly entrenched in English common law.72
Thus, the challenge for cause necessarily broadened to capture prospective jurors
who, for a variety of reasons other than the three ancient challenges for cause,
simply could not be impartial.
English challenges for cause also expanded because the English venire grew
more and more diverse. Originally, presentment jurors were selected by the King's
sheriffs exclusively from the nobility.73 All jurors had to be freehold males under
seventy years old, and their membership in the nobility also meant they typically
owned substantial real property.74 As the Crown's political prosecutions increas-
ingly targeted anti-royalist members of Parliament, Parliament began to react, out
of sheer self-preservation, by making some pro-defendant changes to criminal
procedures, including the methods of jury summoning and selection. Over time,
the King's influence in jury selection waned, and specific levels of property
ownership began to replace rigid feudal qualifications. Many more kinds of
prospective jurors presented themselves for jury duty, and they brought with them
hosts of biases not commonly present when all prospective jurors had been
selected by the King exclusively from the relatively homogeneous class of loyal
nobles.
The final, and perhaps most significant, pressure toward the expansion of the
English challenge for cause was the demise of the English peremptory challenge.
Prior to 1305, the King's prosecutors had an unlimited number of peremptory
challenges, so their resort to challenges for cause was simply unnecessary. As
discussed below, the number of allowable peremptory challenges in England
steadily declined over the next 700 years, and by 1989 they were eliminated
entirely.76 The broadening of the English challenge for cause probably had as
much to do with the narrowing and eventual elimination of the English peremptory
challenge as anything else. There is a deep and unbreakable historical counterpoint
between challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.
Although the right to jury was less than comprehensively embraced at the
constitutional debates, and even in the text of the Constitution itself,77 the Sixth
72. WILLIAM FORSYTHE, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JuRY 125-38 (2d ed. 1971); MOORE, supra note 69, at 56; VON
MoscnzlsIKE,, supra note 71, at 57-58.
73. Douglas Hay, The Class Composition of the Palladium of Liberty: Trial Jurors in the Eighteenth Century,
in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRuE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND 1200-1800, 305, 349-57 (J.S. Cockburn
& Thomas A. Green eds., 1988).
74. id.
75. Id. It is important, however, not to overstate this democratization of the English jury. Even as late as the
eighteenth century, property requirements were still so demanding that seventy-five percent of all male
freeholders had insufficient wealth to qualify for English jury duty. Id.
76. See infra text accompanying notes 106-11.
77. Despite modem popular conventional wisdom to the contrary, the framers expressed a surprising lack of
interest in the jury trial, at least at the federal level. Randolph's original draft of Article II contained no provision
guaranteeing either criminal or civil juries. SAUL K. PADovER, To SECuRE THESE BLESSINGS 419 (1962). Article
HI, Section Two's guaranty of a jury in all federal criminal trials was subsequently added by committee, and was
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Amendment did constitutionalize the long-standing English and colonial common
law guaranties of an impartial jury.7 8 In fact, at least one draft of the Sixth
Amendment expressly provided that a criminal defendant had a right to challenges
for cause,79 although this express reference was later deleted at Madison's urgings,
on the ground that challenges for cause are so inherent in the concept of an
impartial jury that their express mention was unnecessary.80
In 1911, Congress codified the Sixth Amendment notion of the right to an
impartial jury by creating a right in defendants (and prosecutors) to challenge
jurors for cause.8
Because the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of an impartial criminal jury is
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 its implicit requirement
that there be some recognized mechanism-challenges for cause-to effect the
guaranty of impartiality is also binding on the states.8 3 Thus, every state recognizes
a criminal defendant's right, and the prosecutor's right, to challenge jurors for
cause. By statute or rule or both, most states recognize two fundamentally different
types of challenges for cause: ones in which a described relationship between the
juror and some trial participant is irrebuttably presumed to render the juror partial
("principal challenges"); and ones in which the challenger must demonstrate to the
accepted at the convention with no recorded debate or dissent. Id. Although there was some debate on the question
of judicial review of jury verdicts, see infra text accompanying notes 129-30, and even on what may seem to us
today as a rather obscure question of whether the venire should be drawn from a unit as large as a whole state (as
the Sixth Amendment now provides), see, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 7, there is no recorded debate about
the right to jury trial. PADovER, supra, at 419.
The states, by contrast, recognized that the criminal jury trial was an important right. It was the only right
common to the twelve state constitutions that predated the constitutional convention, and it has thereafter
appeared in the state constitutions of every state entering the union. Albert W. Alsehuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CI. L. REv. 867, 870, 875 n.44 (1994).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides (emphasis added): "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed."
79. VALERIE P. HANS & NEEL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 37 (1986), quoting the first draft of the Sixth
Amendment as including "the right of challenge and other accustomed requisites."
80. Id. (noting that Patrick Henry denounced Madison's proposal to delete the reference to challenges for
cause, saying with his customary hyperbole that he "would rather the trial by jury were struck out altogether").
81. Law of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 287, 36 Stat. 1166 (1911) (current version at FED. R. CrIM. P. 24(b) and
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994)).
82. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
83. The Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether challenges for cause are required
by the Sixth Amendment, though almost every state and lower federal court that has addressed the question has
held that the Sixth Amendment's guaranty of impartial juries implicitly requires a mechanism to remove biased
jurors. See, e.g., United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977) (noting that challenges for cause are an
inherent part of Sixth Amendment's guarantee of impartial juries); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1229 (5th
Cir. 1976) (same); Sorter v. Austen, 129 So. 51, 52 (Ala. 1930) (same); People v. Doran, 159 N.E. 379, 385 (N.Y.
1927) (same); see also supra notes 78-81 (discussing Madison's views). See generally FRANcis H. HELLER, THE
StXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 71 (1951) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment
includes the right to challenge for cause). But see United States v. Capua, 656 F.2d 1033, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981)
(noting challenges for cause are not an inherent component of the right to an impartial jury).
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trial judge that the prospective juror is in fact partial ("challenges to the favour"). 84
State principal challenges typically provide that litigants may challenge jurors
who are related not just to the defendant but also to the lawyers,85 are in an
employee/employer relationship with the defendant,86 are in a landlord/tenant
relationship with the defendant, 87 are in a debtor/creditor relationship with the
defendant, 88 are in any fiduciary relationship with the defendant, 89 were witnesses
to any of the alleged events, 90 or were jurors in any previous trial regarding the
same allegations. 91
States that have lists of principal challenges also have a catch-all challenge to
the favor. These catch-alls typically mimic the broad impartiality language of the
Sixth Amendment by providing that all litigants may challenge for cause any jurors
who cannot be "impartial" or "fair" or "unbiased."92
Interestingly, the federal statutes and rules, and the statutes and rules of a
handful of states, do not contain any laundry list of principal challenges for
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-150 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-304 (1999); CAL. CODE Civ. PROC.
§ 229 (1999); CoLo. REV. STAT. 16-10-103 (2000); FLA. STAT. ch. § 913.03 (2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-135
(2000); IDAHO CODE § 19-2020 (2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-5 (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3410
(1999); LA. CODE OF CruM. PROC. art. 797 (2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-223 (2000); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-2006 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16.050 (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §500-A: 12 (2000); N.Y. CriM.
PRoc. LAW § 270.20 (1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-106 (2000); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42 (2000); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 572 (1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-20-13.1
(2000); TEX. CODE C~iM. ANN. art. 35.16 (2000); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.44.180 (2000); Wyo. STAT.
§ 7-11-105 (2000). The terms "principal challenges" and "challenges to the favour" derive from British common
law. See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at *363.
85. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(4) (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10--103(1)(b) (2000); GA. CODEANN.
§ 15-12-163(B)(4) (2000); LA. CODE OF CRIM. PROc. art. 797(3) (2000); MINN. CRIM. PRoc. RULE 26.02 Subd.
5(1)(5) (2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(c) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42(G) (2000); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.180(2) (2000).
86. See, e.g., ARIz. CPiIM. PRoc. RULE 18.4(b)(5) (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-304(b)(2)(i) (1999); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(c) (2000); IA. STAT. § 813.2, Rule 17(5)(e) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3410(2)(b)
(1999); LA. CODE OF CRIM. PRoc. art. 797(3) (2000); MINN. CRIM. PROC. RULE 26.02 Subd. 5(1)(6) (2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 25-7-223(3) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42(E) (2000).
87. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-33-304(2)(B)(1) (1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(c) (2000);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3410(b)(2) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-223(3) (2000).
88. See e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(c) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3410(2)(b) (1999); MoNT.
CODE ANN. § 25-7-223(3) (2000).
89. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(i) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3410(2)(h) (1999).
90. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-150(10) (2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(h) (1999); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 2 2-3410(2)(g) (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-223(3) (2000); N.Y CgiM. PROC. LAW § 270.20(1)(e)
(1999).
91. See, e.g., ARIz. CRrM. PRoc. RULE 18.4(b)(9) (2000); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 16-33-304(b)(2)(B)(v) and (vi)
(t999); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-10-103(1)(f) (1999); FLA STAT. § 913.03(5) (2000); LA. STAT. § 813.2, Rule
17(5)(i) (2000); MINN. CRim. PROC. RULE 26.02 Subd. 5(1 )(10) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (2000); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2313.42(D) (2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.44.180(3) (2000); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-
105(a)(v) (2000).
92. See, e.g. ARiz. R. CRiM,. PRoc. Rule 18.4(b) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.03(10) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 15A-1212(9) (2000).
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cause.93 In theory, all challenges for cause in federal courts and in these few state
courts are challenges to the favor, and the challenger must actually prove to the
judge that the prospective juror, for whatever reason, cannot be fair and impartial.
In practice, however, a common law has evolved that mimics the principal
challenges. Beginning as early as 1807, state and federal courts have recognized
that certain relationships between prospective jurors and litigants give rise to
"implied bias," and should be disqualifying even in the absence of satisfactory
evidence of actual bias.94 The laundry list of implied biases includes the same
kinds of juror-litigant relationships recognized in most states as principal chal-
lenges, including kinship, financial interest and former jury service in the same
cause.
95
93. Indeed, Rule 24, which governs the examination of prospective jurors, does not contain the words
"challenge for cause" or "impartiality." FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. The federal right to challenges for cause is set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2000) ("All challenges for cause or favor, whether to the array or panel or to individual jurors,
shall be determined by the court.") Interestingly, the statute contains no list of principal challenges; it merely
provides that challenges for cause are to be ruled upon by the trial court.
There are a small number of states that follow the federal scheme of providing no list of principal challenges,
relying instead on the generic challenge to the favor. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-105(c) (2000); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 635-27 (2000); ILL. COD. STAT. ANN. § 705:305/15 (2000); Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-5-79 (2000); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 494.470 (1999); N.J. STAT. § 2B:23-10 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-14 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 9-10-14 (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-1020 (1999).
94. In United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 49 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692), which was one of several reported
cases arising out of the prosecution of Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall held that a prospective juror must be
removed if he expresses an unqualified opinion that the defendant is guilty. In explaining what today seems like a
rather straightforward challenge to the favor, Chief Justice Marshall made reference to the implied bias that
underlies well-recognized principal challenges:
Why is it that the most distant relative of a party cannot serve upon his jury? Certainly the single
circumstance of relationship, taken in itself, unconnected with its consequences, would furnish no
objection. The real reason for the rule is, that the law suspects the relative of partiality; suspects his
mind to be under a bias, which will prevent his fairly hearing and fairly deciding on the testimony
which may be offered to him. The end to be obtained is an impartial jury; to secure this end, a man
is prohibited from serving on it whose connexion with a party is such to induce a suspicion of
partiality.
25 Fed. Cas. at 50. But see Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220-21 (1990) (declining to apply the implied bias
doctrine where juror had applied for a job as an investigator with prosecutor's office). In the state courts, see, e.g.,
State v. Kauhi, 948 P.2d 1036, 1040-41 (Haw. 1997) (implying bias as a matter of law where prospective juror
was a prosecutor in same office as prosecutor trying defendant); State v. Sanchez, 901 P.2d 178, 183-84 (N.M.
1995) (holding that some relationships with the prosecutor require removal for bias as a matter of law, but tenuous
relationship present in this case did not so require); Taylor v. State, 656 So.2d 104, 111 (Miss. 1995) (holding that
implied bias exists when ajuror is related to an attorney employed by the prosecuting attorney's office).
95. See United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 983-85 (2d Cir. 1967). Of course, since the implied bias
doctrine is a matter of common law, there is much more room for disagreement among courts about precisely what
kinds of relationships should be presumed disqualifying than there is in those state courts where the disqualifying
relationships are expressly itemized by rule or statute. There is also considerable controversy about where the line
between implied bias and actual bias should be drawn; that is, what kind of relationships will be irrebuttably
presumed disqualifying, and what relationships will require proof of actual bias. Id.
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B. Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges first appeared in England sometime between 1250 and
1300.96 They were initially recognized only in criminal cases, and indeed only in
capital criminal cases.97 Only the King's prosecutors, not the defendant, had a right
to exercise peremptory challenges, and there was no limit to the number of
peremptory challenges the King's prosecutors could exercise.98
As large presentment juries began to evolve into smaller trial juries, the
peremptory challenge probably began simply as a mechanism to reduce the
unwieldy size of the presentment jury. Faced with the prospect of having to cut
down large presentment juries to twelve-man trial juries, prosecutors were re-
quired by sheer arithmetic to excuse many presentment jurors. 99
There is some historical support for the proposition that these early peremptory
challenges, both to the presentment juries themselves and later to the separately
summoned trial juries, were not really peremptory challenges at all but rather were
challenges for cause made by an infallible King. If the King's prosecutors asserted
that a prospective juror had some connection to the defendant sufficient to require
his removal under the then narrow English challenges for cause, that royal
assertion was deemed infallible, and no further inquiry was necessary.' ° Some
commentators have also suggested that early English peremptory challenges were
actually a kind of shorthand challenge for cause in small English villages and
towns, where it was commonplace for lawyers, judges, jurors and defendants to be
well acquainted with one another and, thus, for cause disqualifictions to be obvious
to all.10 '
In an almost immediate response to the King's unlimited peremptory challenges
in capital cases, English courts began to permit criminal defendants in capital cases
to exercise their own peremptory challenges. By 1300, it was well-settled as a
matter of common law that in all capital cases the Crown had an unlimited number
of peremptory challenges and the defendant had thirty-five.102
In 1305, in a further effort to limit the King's abusive prosecutorial powers,
Parliament passed the Ordinance for Inquests, which abolished all prosecutorial
peremptory challenges but retained the defendant's thirty-five peremptory chal-
lenges."0 3 The King's courts immediately side-stepped the Ordinance for Inquests
96. See PROFFATr, supra note 69, § 155 (noting historical roots of peremptory challenges in England).
97. Id.
98. Id.; VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 147.
99. See supra note 69.
100. PROFFArr, supra note 69, § 159; VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 148.
101. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges, and
the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CI. L. REv. 153, 165 & n,51 (1989).
102. IpOFFATr, supra note 69, § 155.
103. 33 Edw. 1 (1305) (Eng.). For a discussion of the Ordinance for Inquests, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra~ote
71, at *347 and FORSYrE, supra note 72, at 192.
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by adopting a common law procedure they called "standing aside," in which the
King's prosecutors could direct any number of prospective jurors to "stand aside"
pending selection from the balance of the reporting panel.' 4 Subject only to the
problem of running out of regular jurors and being forced to use some of the jurors
who were standing aside, which circumstance was presumably quite rare given the
limited nature of challenges for cause, 1 0 5 this procedure was of course tantamount
to giving the prosecution an unlimited number of peremptory challenges.
From 1305 forward, the number of allowable defense peremptory challenges in
English criminal trials steadily decreased. Parliament reduced them from thirty-
five to twenty in 1530,106 to seven in 1948,107 to three in 1977, t08 and abolished
them entirely in 1989.109 Despite even these reduced numbers, one of the most
striking things about the 700-year history of English peremptory challenges is that
defendants almost never exercised them. Indeed, they were so rarely exercised that
some scholars have posited that ordinary criminal defendants simply had no
"right" to any peremptory challenges, despite the pronouncements of Parlia-
ment." And although the prosecution theoretically retained its power to ask
prospective jurors to stand aside, the standing aside procedure was just as rare, and
perhaps even rarer, than the exercise of defense peremptories."'
Most American colonial courts accepted the English common law practice of
giving criminal defendants some peremptory challenges, but they were in sharp
disagreement over the question of whether the prosecution should have any
peremptory challenges at all, by standing aside or otherwise. Some colonies
allowed prosecutors an unlimited number of peremptory challenges, while others
allowed none." 2
104. See VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 148. See also PROFFATr, supra note 69, § 160.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
106. 22 Hen. 8, ch. 14 § 6 (1530) (Eng.).
107. 11 and 12 Geo. 6, ch. 58 § 35 (1948) (Eng.).
108. The Criminal Law Act, 1977, ch. 45 § 43 (Eng.).
109. The Criminal Justice Act, 1988, ch. 33 § 118 (Eng.).
110. J.B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century, in COCKBURN AND GREEN, supra note 73,
at 71 (noting an exhaustive study of jury records in the last half of the fourteenth century uncovered no evidence
of the use of any peremptory challenges). A similar study of the jury records in Essex County, spanning most of
the eighteenth century, concluded that even by that late date peremptory challenges were "rarely used." P.J.R.
King, "Illiterate Plebeians, Easily Mislead:" Jury Composition, Experience, and Behaviour in Essex 1735-1815,
in COCKURN AND GREEN, supra note 73, at 277-78. As late as 1979, peremptory challenges were still the
exception in England rather than the rule, with no more than one in seven trials having even a single peremptory
challenge used. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRILALs 92-93 (1979). To put the infrequency of
even the modem English peremptory challenge into some perspective, the infamous spy trial that acted as the
catalyst for the abolition of the English peremptory challenge in 1989-the so-called Cyprus Spy Trial-involved
seven co-defendants, all of whom pooled their peremptory challenges and exercised a grand total of seven.
Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges Should be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHI. L. REv.
809, 822 (1997).
111. BALDWIN & MCCONvILLE, supra note 110, at 93 n. 15 (citing a separate survey which found that the
exercise of jury challenges was used far more frequently by the defense).
112. VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 148.
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This was the mixed state of colonial affairs at the time of the constitutional
debates. There is no record of any discussion by the framers, formal or informal,
about peremptory challenges. Article 1II, Section 2 of the Constitution secures the
fight to jury in all federal criminal trials, but makes no mention of the peremptory
challenge." 13 Indeed, in 1919 the Court held in Stilson v. United States"4 that
"[t]here is nothing in the Constitution of the United States which requires the
Congress to grant peremptory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by
an impartial jury is all that is secured." 5
Congress codified the English practice in 1790, by giving thirty-five peremptory
challenges to defendants in federal treason cases and twenty in all other federal
capital cases.'1 6 It did not address the question of defense peremptories in
non-capital federal cases, or the question of whether the prosecution had any
peremptory challenges in any kind of federal criminal case. Federal courts in these
early years were sharply divided over the question of whether federal prosecutors
had a common law fight to peremptory challenges, either traditionally or by
standing aside.11 7 The Supreme Court settled the matter in 1856, when it held in
United States v. Shackleford that neither prosecutorial peremptories nor standing
aside were rooted in federal common law, and that federal courts must instead look
to state procedures to decide whether federal prosecutors could peremptorily
excuse prospective jurors or have them stand aside.
1 18
In a direct though somewhat delayed response to Shackleford, Congress estab-
lished in 1865 that in all non-capital federal felony cases defendants would have
ten peremptory challenges and the prosecution two, and that in capital cases the
prosecution would have five peremptory challenges but defendants' peremptories
113. U.S. CONST., Art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3 states:
The trials of all Crimes, except in Cases of impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be
held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within
any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
114. 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
115. Id. at 586. This early recognition by the Court-that peremptory challenges are not a necessary condition
for the constitutional requirement of juror impartiality-seems to have been lost over the years, as the Court
began to ascribe more and more quasi-constitutional importance to the peremptory challenge. See infra text
accompanying notes 159-65.
116. Law of April 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 30, 1 Stat. 119 (1790) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)).
117. United States v. Marchant, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 480, 483-84 (1827) (Story, J.) (suggesting, in dictum, that
federal prosecutors have an unlimited number of peremptory challenges via standing aside). This appears to have
become the accepted view in most lower federal courts. VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 149 (stating that although
Justice Story's comment about prosecutorial peremptories in Marchant was not binding, it was nevertheless
followed by most federal judges). But this view was not unanimous. See, e.g., United States v. Douglass, 25 F.
Cas. 896, 898-99 (C.C.N.Y. 1851) (No. 14,988) (Betts, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is no justification to
return to the discredited English practice of standing aside, and that federal prosecutors should therefore have no
common law right to any peremptory challenges).
118. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 588 (1856).
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would be decreased from thirty-five to twenty."t 9 In 1872, Congress increased the
number of prosecutorial peremptories in non-capital cases from two to three, and
for the first time extended the notion of peremptory challenges to federal civil
cases (giving each side three) and to federal misdemeanors (giving each side
three).120 In 1911, Congress changed the peremptory challenge numbers again: six
for the prosecution and twenty for the defendant in capital cases; six for the
prosecution and ten for the defendant in non-capital felony cases; and three each in
misdemeanor and civil cases. 
1 2'
When the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted in 1946, Rule
24(b) increased the prosecution's peremptories in capital cases to equal the
defendant's at twenty. 22 That 1946 version is the scheme currently in place in the
federal courts: each side gets twenty peremptory challenges in capital cases; the
prosecution gets six and the defendant ten in non-capital felony cases; and each
side gets three in misdemeanor and civil cases. 1
23
This federal evolution in peremptory challenges was generally mimicked in the
states. By 1790, most states recognized by statute a defendant's right to some
peremptory challenges, and most states shared the pre-Shackleford federal view
that prosecutors had a common law right to some peremptory challenges. 124 Only
fourteen years after Shackleford-by 1870-almost all states had enacted statutes
119. Law of March 3, 1865, ch. 86, § 2, 13 Stat. 500 (1865) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)).
120. Law of June 8, 1872, ch. 333, § 2, 17 Stat. 282 (1872) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) and 28
U.S.C. § 1870 (1994)).
121. Law of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 287, 36 Stat. 1166 (1911) (current version at FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) and
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994)).
122. FED. R. CRMt. P. 24(b).
123. Id. (criminal); 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1994) (civil).
There have been a few attempts since 1946 to reduce the number of federal peremptory challenges further,
driven primarily by concerns about their racially discriminatory use.
In 1976, the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules proposed that Rule 24(b) be amended to
reduce the number of peremptory challenges to five for each side in non-capital felonies, and two for each side in
misdemeanors. FED. R. CRiL. P. 24 advisory committee's notes. The change was approved by the Court but
rejected by Congress. ld.; S. REP. No. 95-354 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 527, 532.
The Committee tried again in March 1990, proposing that peremptory challenges be reduced to six for each
side in non-capital cases, again to no avail. FED. R. Caim. P. 24 advisory committee's notes.
In late 1997, a subcommittee of the District of Columbia Jury Project recommended that peremptory challenges
be abolished entirely in the federal and superior courts in the District Council for Court Excellence District of
Columbia Jury Project, DRAFT SUMMARY REPORT (Dec. 1997) (on file with the American Criminal Law Review)
(Proposed Recommendation 30.4). In its final report, the full committee recommended in the alternative that
peremptory challenges be abolished entirely, or that that they be "drastically reduced"-to three for each side in
non-capital felonies and one for each side in misdemeanors and civil cases. Recommendation 19(d), Council for
Court Excellence District of Columbia Jury Project, JURIES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO
IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON, D.C. 24 (Feb. 1998) (on file with the American Criminal Law
Review); also available at http://www.courtexcellence.org/juryreform/juries2000_final-report.pdf (last visited
10/21/01). Congress has not yet acted on these recommendations.
124. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 215-17 nn.16-20 (1965) (cataloging the peremptory challenge
procedures of states).
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granting both the prosecution and the defense some peremptory challenges. 125
Today, every state recognizes some number of peremptory challenges for both
sides in criminal and civil cases, though it is interesting that many states continue
to follow the asymmetry of federal Rule 24(b) by giving the prosecution consider-
ably fewer peremptory challenges than the defense.
1 26
Although state courts were certainly free, even after Stilson, to hold that there is
a state constitutional right to peremptory challenges, we have found no such cases.
Similarly, even though state courts were free after Shackleford to ground the
peremptory challenge in state common law, we have again found no such cases.
Thus, peremptory challenges in all state courts, like those in federal court, are
creatures of statute and court rule, and are not compelled either by the Constitution
or by the common law. 1
27
C. Judicial Review
It is important to recognize that peremptory challenges long antedated the right
of a criminal defendant to appeal a conviction, both in England and America.
Indeed, there was never an English or federal common law right to a criminal
appeal.1 28 The founders engaged in some limited debates about the question of
whether our Constitution should recognize the right to a criminal appeal,1 29 but
125. Id. at 216 n.18 (listing those states that granted the prosecution a "substantial number" of peremptory
challenges).
126. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-301(c) (allowing, for cases with the potential of twenty
years or greater imprisonment, ten peremptory challenges for defendant and five for state); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2B:23-13(b) (allowing, for serious felonies, twenty peremptory challenges for defendant and twelve for the
state); MINN. R. CRIM. PROC. 26.02 subd. 6 (allowing, for offenses with the potential for life imprisonment, fifteen
peremptories for defendant and nine for state; for all other offenses, five peremptories for defendant and three for
state).
127. The history of peremptory challenges in the state courts is primarily a history of racial exclusion.
Peremptory challenges were the last best tool of Jim Crow, used quite efficiently by southern prosecutors to
eliminate the new black faces that began to appear for jury duty after Reconstruction. See generally Hoffman,
supra note 110, at 827-30. The systematic use of prosecutorial peremptory challenges to exclude blacks was not
limited to the Deep South. As late as 1880, no black person had ever served as a juror in the state of Delaware. See
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. (13 Otto) 370, 397 (1880). It is harder to say whether northern prosecutors used the
peremptory challenge as comprehensively as their southern brethren to keep free and emancipated blacks off
northern juries, because northern states, unlike southern and border states, kept almost no information about the
racial make-up of summoned jurors during Reconstruction. See Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Challenge:
Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Challenges, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
11 n.39 (1990).
128. Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1904).
129. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 489-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961); VAN
DYKE, supra note 67, at 7. It appears these pre-constitutional debates were over by the time Congress debated the
Bill of Rights. David Rossman, "Were There No Appeal: " The History of Review in American Criminal Courts,
81 J. CRUM. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 555 (1990) ("Nothing in the Congressional debates over the Bill of Rights
directly addressed... review of criminal convictions.").
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ultimately decided it should not.130 In 1881, Congress gave the Supreme Court
statutory authority to review federal death penalty convictions by writ of error, 
13 1
but it was not until the Court of Appeals Act of 1891 that federal criminal
defendants had a generalized statutory right to a criminal appeal. 132
The evolution of the right to a criminal appeal in the state courts followed a
similar pattern. Most colonial and early state courts followed the English tradition
of not recognizing any common law right to a criminal appeal. 133 All fifty states
eventually recognized the right to a criminal appeal by rule or statute, and none of
these provisions has ever been repealed. 
134
The fact that peremptory challenges were part of the criminal trial process long
before there was any statutory or constitutional right to a criminal appeal is
important when we consider the problem of curative peremptory challenges. As
Justice Scalia observed in his concurrence in Martinez-Salazar, peremptory
challenges must have had a fundamentally curative purpose in these early years,
when they represented the only way to correct a trial judge's erroneous retention of
a biased juror.1 35 As he also observed, we distort that historical purpose when we
allow a criminal defendant the option of either using a peremptory challenge to
remove a biased juror or hoarding the peremptory challenge and appealing the
conviction. 1
36
130. Although the Bill of Rights secures many rights for criminal defendants, the right to an appeal is not one
of them. The Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently indicated that criminal defendants have no right
under the Constitution to an appeal of their convictions, though, remarkably, these indications have always been
in dictum and the Court has never addressed the issue squarely. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551
(1987); Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974); McCane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); see also Daniel J. Meltzer,
Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 9 n.46 (1994) (arguing that a five justice
majority on the current Court supports the proposition that there is no right of appeal from a criminal conviction).
Most interesting to us, as we examine the harmlessness of certain jury selection errors, is Professor Meltzer's
profoundly creative look at the extent to which the conventional view that there is no constitutional right to appeal
conflicts with the whole post-Chapman construct of harmless error. Meltzer, supra. As Professor Meltzer puts it,
if Chapman is itself a rule of constitutional law, binding on all the states, then why can't states craft a harmless
error standard less protective of defendants, since they can do away with criminal appeals entirely? Id. at 3-4. We
might put it more bluntly: how can there be "structural" error if there is no error at all (because there are no
appeals)? In the end, Professor Meltzer solves this problem by positing that Chapman and the cases that followed
it are not based on the Constitution itself, but rather are a kind of constitutional common law reversible by
Congress. Id. at 5; see also Craig Goldblatt, Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress's Power
to Reverse Arizona v. Fulminante, 60 U. Cm. L. REV. 985 (1993).
131. Act of February 6, 1889, ch. 113, 25 Stat. 655 (1889) (allowing appeal as of right upon writ of error filed
by respondent sentenced to death).
132. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (creating right to appeal directly to the Supreme Court
in capital cases and infamous crimes).
133. Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REv. 503, 521
n.79 (1992) (noting lack of a right of appeal from criminal conviction at founding); Meltzer, supra note 130, at 6
(noting that there is no textual or historical support for a criminal appeal).
134. Arkin, supra note 133, at 513-14.
135. See supra text accompanying note 55-56.
136. Id.
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V. HARMLESS ERROR, STRUCTURAL ERROR AND PLAIN ERROR
Before we examine the problem of the curative use of peremptory challenges
and the effect, if any, that an imbalance in peremptory challenges should have on
the integrity of criminal convictions, we pause to consider the general notions of
harmless error, structural error and plain error. It is, after all, in the context of these
larger doctrines that the jury selection errors addressed in this article must




No trials are perfect, and the idea that not all trial imperfections infect the
integrity of the truth-finding process is a central limitation to the judicial review of
jury verdicts. Indeed, as modem constitutional law and criminal procedure have
vastly complicated the trial machinery, there are more opportunities than ever for
various "errors" to creep into the trial process, and a correspondingly unprec-
edented demand that our appellate courts separate the important errors from the
unimportant ones. The devil, of course, is in the details, and in the lines we draw
between the kinds of trial errors we will and will not tolerate.
It has always been so. Although many harmless error opponents claim our
modem harmless error rule is in derogation of English common law, 138 in fact the
earliest English pronouncements on the subject recognized a broad concept of
harmless error. As early as 1807, in a criminal case involving the erroneous
admission of evidence, the King's Bench declared that there must be a new trial
only "if the case without such improper evidence were.., not clearly made out...
and the improper evidence might be supposed to have had an effect on the minds of
the jury."' 139 The precise test of harmlessness changed from case to case, 140 but it
was well-recognized throughout the late 1700s and early 1800s, at least in the
King's Courts, that not all trial error required reversal. Legal historians often refer
137. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
138. See, e.g., Charles L. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 501, 516-21 (1998); Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm ofApplying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions, 105 HARv.
L. REv. 152, 156 (1991); Note, Ake v. Oklahoma and Harmless Error: The Casefor a Per Se Rule of Reversal, 81
VA. L. REv. 521, 531 (1995). Perhaps Justice Traynor bears some responsibility for this common historical
misunderstanding because he begins his influential treatise with a discussion of Crease v. Barrett, 149 Eng. Rep.
1353 (Ex. 1835), the Exchequer case commonly credited with establishing the rule that no error is harmless.
ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 4 (1970). Yet he makes it clear, later in the introductory
section, that he believes Crease itself did not establish the per se reversible error rule, but rather that subsequent
cases misinterpreted its meaning. TRAYNoR, supra, at 4-7; see infra note 146.
139. Rex v. Ball, 168 Eng. Rep. 721 (K.B. 1807).
140. In fact, the harmlessness inquiry seems to have become more and more forgiving in the years after Ball.
For example, in the much-cited Doe v. Tyler, 130 Eng. Rep. 1397, 1398 (CP. 1830), the court held that jury
verdicts would not be reversed if "there is enough to warrant the finding of the jury independently of the evidence
objected to and. . . when the jury are right upon that portion of the evidence which is unimpeached."
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to the harmless error rules announced in these early criminal cases as establishing
the "Orthodox English Rule." 141
The Orthodox English Rule was more forgiving than our modem notions of
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Under the Orthodox English Rule, all trial
errors were subject to the harmless error inquiry; that is, the Orthodox English
Rule had no exception, like our pre-Chapman142 approach, for errors deemed to be
particularly significant, or, as we would say, for errors of constitutional magni-
tude. 143 Moreover, if an appellate court were "satisfied" that the trial error did not
affect the trial outcome, the conviction was affirmed.t"4
Not until the mid-i 800s did the Orthodox English Rule begin to give way to a
rule of per se reversal. An 1835 civil case decided in the Exchequer Courts, Crease
v. Barrett,"45 is generally credited as having originated the so-called Exchequer
Rule, under which virtually all trial error was automatically reversible. 146 Its
legacy was short-lived. Parliament abrogated the Exchequer Rule with its adoption
of the Judicature Act of 1873, under which civil trial errors were presumed
harmless unless "some substantial wrong or miscarriage occurred." 1
47
The history of harmless error in America mirrored its history in England-both
in terms of the common law and in terms of legislative responses to the common
law. 148 Because the Orthodox English Rule was well entrenched during the early
post-Revolutionary period, most colonial courts and their state court successors
accepted it.'49 But the Exchequer Rule eventually found its way into our common
law, as it did in England. By 1900, most state and federal appellate courts were of
the mind that virtually all trial errors, no matter how trivial, required reversal and a
141. See TRAYNOR, supra note 138, at 7; Goldblatt, supra note 130, at 993.
142. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also discussion of Chapman in infra text accompanying
notes 156-166.
143. See Goldblatt, supra note 138, at 995.
144. See supra note 140.
145. 149 Eng. Rep. 1353 (Ex. 1835).
146. In fact, scholars disagree about whether Crease marks the beginning of the Exchequer Rule. Professor
Wigmore contends that Crease was indeed a per se reversal case, and that the Exchequer Rule therefore dates
from that decision. 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 21, at 887-88 (3d ed. 1983). Justice Traynor, on the other hand,
makes a compelling case that Crease was not really a per se reversal case at all, that later cases misconstrued its
holding, and therefore that the Exchequer Rule was not in fact established in England until the time of those later
cases, in the 1850s. TRAYNOR, supra note 138, at 4-7. In any event, everyone agrees that by the mid-1 850s the per
se reversal principles of the Exchequer Rule were firmly entrenched.
Interestingly, the harmless error traditions embodied in the Original English Rule were the product of criminal
cases decided in the King's Courts, while the Exchequer Rule claims its origins in a civil case (Crease) about a
landlord's right to royalties on his tenant's tin. Perhaps these two very different ways of looking at the role of
juries and the reliability of their verdicts is a remnant of the ancient English preoccupation with accuracy in real
property cases. Indeed, the very first English jury trials were not criminal trials, but were instead assizes convened
throughout England by William the Conqueror to decide real property disputes between and among the Norman
victors and the Anglo-Saxon vanquished. MOORE, supra note 69, at 33-34.
147. TRAYNOR, supra note 138, at 8-9.
148. See generally id. at 13-14.
149. See Ogletree, supra note 138, at 156.
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new trial.'° These cases, just as in England, triggered a quick legislative response.
Beginning as early as 1912, states began to enact legislation overruling the per
se cases.'51 All fifty states presently have harmless error statutes or rules. 152 In
1919, Congress did the same for the federal courts, enacting its own harmless error
statute.153 The federal harmless error statute remains in effect today, and indeed
was incorporated with slightly different language into the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, as Rule 52(a).154
Until 1967, the federal harmless error statute and rule, and their state counter-
parts, were widely assumed to be inapplicable to trial errors that deprived
defendants of constitutionally based rights. 155 All this changed in 1967, when the
Court, in Chapman v. California,156 held that even constitutional errors can be
harmless if the appellate court is sufficiently confident that the constitutional error
did not affect the trial outcome. In particular, the Court in Chapman held that a
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, in the form of the prosecutor
commenting in closing arguments on the defendant's decision not to testify, could
be harmless. 57 The Chapman Court also held that the prosecution must "prove
150. See TRAYNOR, supra note 138, at 14. One commentator described the American appellate courts at the
turn of the century as "impregnable citadels of technicality." See id. (quoting Marcus A. Kavanagh, Improvement
of Administration of Criminal Justice by Exercise of Judicial Power, II A.B.A. J. 217, 222 (1925)); see also
Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. L. REv. 729, 738
(1906) (discussing the "sporting theory of justice" prevalent at the time).
It is difficult to overstate the triviality of some of the errors that resulted in the reversals of criminal convictions
under the per se rule. See, e.g., People v. Vice, 21 Cal. 344, 345 (1863) (reversing a robbery conviction because
indictment failed to state that the victim's property did not belong to the defendant); People v. St. Clair, 56 Cal.
406,407 (1880) (reversing larceny conviction because indictment omitted the letter "n" from the word "larceny");
Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402, 403 (1871) (reversing a conviction because the indictment described the crime as
having been committed "against the peace of the State" instead of against the "peace and dignity of the State").
151. See CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 461, cmt. (1930).
152. See Goldblatt, supra note 138, at 994. See also Chapman v. United States, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (stating
that as of 1967, all fifty-states had harmless error rules).
153. 40 Stat. 1181 (February 26, 1919) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1999)) ("On the hearing of any appeal or
writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to
errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.").
154. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a) ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.").
155. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946) ("If the error did not influence the jury, or
had but slight effect, the verdict and judgment should stand, except perhaps where the departure is from a
constitutional norm."); see also Phillip J. Mause, Harmless Constitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v.
California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519,520 (1969).
156. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
157. Id. at 24-25. Mr. Chapman and a co-defendant were convicted in a California state court of robbery,
kidnapping and murder. At the time of the trial, the California Constitution expressly allowed prosecutors to
comment in closing arguments on a defendant's decision not to testify. CALIF. CONsT., art. I, § 13 (repealed
November 5, 1974). In accordance with that expressly allowed practice, the Chapman prosecutor commented
extensively on Mr. Chapman's and his co-defendant's decision not to testify. While the case was on appeal in the
California courts, the United States Supreme Court decided Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), holding
that prosecutorial comment on a defendant's decision not to testify itself violated the defendant's right against
self-incrimination. The Chapman case presented the Court with a perfect opportunity to consider whether it
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained."' 
58
Chapman marked a sea change in the Court's approach to harmless error. For the
first time since the Original English Rule, the truth-finding reliability of the
process, and not the process itself, once again became the focus of the harmless
error inquiry.' 59 Since Chapman, the Court has added one constitutional error after
another to the growing list of constitutional errors subject to harmless error review,
including: impeaching a defendant with his or her post-Miranda silence;
160
admitting a coerced confession;' 66 giving the jury over-broad instructions in the
sentencing stage of a capital case; 162 giving the jury an instruction containing an
erroneous conclusive presumption; 163 and giving the jury a burden-shifting instruc-
tion.' 64 Indeed, just three years after Chapman, the Court was already describing
the notion of applying harmless error review to constitutional errors as the rule,
and per se reversals for constitutional errors as the exception.
1 65
But the exceptions have not disappeared entirely. There remains a very small
would continue to apply the per se reversal rule to an error of now unmistakable, if recent, constitutional
dimension.
It is nevertheless somewhat surprising that the Court chose Chapman as the vehicle for such a fundamental
change in course, since the actual holding of the case was that the error there was not harmless, and Mr.
Chapman's conviction was affirmed. As Professor Muller has put it:
There was something contrived about using Chapman for this purpose, since the Court went on to
hold that the Griffin error in the case was not harmless. One might have expected the Court to wait
to craft a harmless error rule in a case where the rule actually made a difference. Still, the
gratuitous Chapman rule has never been treated as dictum.
See Muller, supra note 14, at 109 n.107.
158. 386 U.S. at 24. In an earlier case, Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87 (1963), the Court described the
standard of harmlessness, in an evidentiary context, as "whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained of might have contributed to the conviction." The Chapman Court expressly stated that "Itlhere is
little, if any, difference" between this Fahy standard and the standard it announced. 386 U.S. at 24. Despite these
protestations of equivalence, commentators have suggested that the Court's standard for harmlessness has, just
like its shrinkage of structural error, become more and more forgiving over time. See, e.g., David McCord, The
"Trial"/"Structural" Error Dichotomy: Erroneous, and Not Harmless, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 1401 (1997).
159. Several commentators view Chapman as merely an example of a larger movement by the Court toward a
reliability-based model of the criminal process. See, e.g., Muller, supra note 157; Thomas Stacy, The Searchfor
the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1369 (1991); see also Louis Michael
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of the Continuity and Change in Criminal
Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436 (1980).
160. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). Brecht was a particularly significant harmless error case,
because it arose in a habeas corpus context. The Court applied the more demanding harmless error standard set
forth for habeas review (whether the error had "substantial and injurious effect on the verdict"), rather than the
less demanding Chapman harmless error standard for direct review (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Id. at
623 (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946)).
161. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991).
162. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 752-53 (1990).
163. Carrela v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 266 (1989).
164. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391,402 (1991).
165. Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578-79 (1986).
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group of errors, which the Court has come to label "structural errors," that continue
to merit automatic reversal.
B. Structural Error
In Chapman itself, the Court identified three kinds of constitutional rights-the
right to counsel, the right to the suppression of a coerced confession and the right
to an unbiased judge-as "so basic to a fair trial" that their denial would not be
subject to harmless error analysis and would instead compel automatic reversal. 166
The Chapman Court did not articulate in any more detail whether these three
particular types of errors were immune from its sweeping change because they
involved particularly important rights that justified protection regardless of their
impact on trial outcomes, or rather whether they were simply the kinds of error that
always affect trial outcomes.
In Arizona v. Fulminante,1 67 the Court not only struck one of Chapman's three
untouchable categories of errors that required automatic reversal-the erroneous
admission of a coerced confession-it also coined the term "structural" error to
describe the dwindling group of errors immune to harmless error analysis.1 68 Most
importantly, the Fulminante Court made it absolutely clear that structural errors
require reversal not because they implicate rights abstractly deserving of some
greater degree of protection, but rather because those rights are so bound up with
the reliability of the process that we irrebuttably presume their violation had an
effect on outcome.
1 69
The Fulminante Court added three structural errors to the Chapman
list it had just reduced by one: 170 the denial of the right to self-representa-
166. 386 U.S. at 23, at 23 & n.8.
167. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
168. Id. at 309 ("These are structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by
'harmless error' standards.").
169. As Chief Justice Rehnquist put it in his majority opinion on the structural error issue:
[S]tructural [errors are] defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by
"harm-less-error" standards. The entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end is obviously
affected by the absence of counsel for a criminal defendant, just as it is by the presence on the
bench of a judge who is not impartial. Since our decision in Chapman, other cases have added to
the category of constitutional errors which are not subject to harmless error ... . Each of these
constitutional deprivations is a similar structural defect affecting the framework within which the
trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself. "Without these basic
protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt
or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair."
Id. at 309-10 (quoting Rose, 478 U.S. at 577-78).
170. 499 U.S. at 310. To be more precise, the Fulminante Court confirmed, in the new language of "structural
error," its earlier rulings that these errors require automatic reversal. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-66
(1986) (racially discriminatory grand jury selection); Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984) (public trial);
McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177-78 & n.8 (1984) (self-representation).
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tion; t17 the denial of the right to a public trial;1 72 and the discriminatory
exclusion of members of a defendant's race from a grand jury. 17 3 In the ten
years since Fulminante, the Court has added only one class of errors to the list
of structural errors requiring automatic reversal: the giving of a constitution-
ally deficient instruction on the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 1
74
Despite a firestorm of criticism, both inside the Court's own ranks 75 and in the
171. This seems like a decidedly odd kind of error to treat as deserving automatic reversal under Fulminante's
enlightened inquiry into reliability. Does the Court really mean to say that self-representation is so bound up with
a positive trial outcome that we must irrebuttably presume prejudice when a defendant is not allowed to represent
him or herself? On the contrary, this may be one of those rights whose violation we may safely say results in a
better outcome for the defendant. Perhaps we should create a new per se category of errors: those whose violation
is irrebuttably presumed to have been harmless. Despite its embrace of the reliability value, it appears this new
structural error simply reflects the Court's view that the right to self-representation is so important that it must be
protected in this fashion. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 (1984) (holding that appointment of
stand-by counsel to pro se defendant does not infringe upon that defendant's right to self-representation, so long
as the defendant may still "present his own case his own way").
172. The abridgment of a defendant's right to a public trial is a perfect example of post-Fulminante structural
error. The institutional values we place in airing our trials in public far outweigh any intrinsic value a particular
defendant might enjoy from a public trial. That is, the very reasons we insist on public trials are bound up with the
fundamental reliability of the process as a whole. We have decided that public trials, on the whole, will be more
reliable than private ones, and we will therefore not tolerate private trials even if a particular private trial is
perfectly fair and the outcome of that particular trial perfectly reliable. See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 43,
49-50 (1984) (closing a suppression hearing to the pubic violates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a public trial
and requires new suppression hearing).
173. It is difficult to understand how errors in the selection of grand jurors implicate the reliability of trial
verdicts. As discussed in supra note 14, the Court has never addressed the question of whether ordinary Batson
error in the selection of a trial jury is structural error or may be harmless, and the question is far from self-evident.
See Muller, supra note 14, at 94-96. But in Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-66 (1986), the Court held that the
prosecution's practices of racially discriminating against prospective grand jurors tainted the subsequent
conviction and required reversal. The inclusion of Vasquez error in Fulminante's new list of structural errors may
simply reflect the Court's continuing uneasiness with the notion that reliability alone should be the pole star of
harmlessness. As Professor Muller has put it:
Vasquez ... sits uncomfortably in Fulminante's list of structural errors requiring automatic
reversal .... Modem grand juries are notoriously dependent on, and controlled by, the prosecu-
tor.... Whatever might be said of the harm that racial exclusion causes to the verdict pronounced
by an independent and autonomous petit jury, the same cannot be said for the impact of racial
exclusion on the indictment produced by a subservient grand jury.
Muller, supra note 14, at 112-13 n. 131 (citations omitted).
174. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). The Court has also strongly suggested, in a
pre-Fulminante case and therefore in pre-Fulminante language, that a trial court commits structural error when it
directs a verdict of conviction in a criminal case. See Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986). Some federal
circuit courts have interpreted Rose as meaning that a trial court also commits structural error even when it
partially directs a verdict against the defendant on one element. See, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932,
938 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that the harmless error rule is inapplicable when a judge fails to instruct the jury on
one element of the crime); see also Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (finding that a trial court
abuses its discretion when it allows prosecution to put on evidence of an element of the offense-a prior
conviction-which defendant confesses).
175. The Fulminante Court was badly divided. The case contains four separate opinions reflecting permuta-
tions of three questions: was Mr. Fulminante's jailhouse confession coerced, does harmless error analysis apply
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academy, 176 there is every indication that Fulminante's reliability-based view of
harmless error is here to stay. Indeed, in 1999, the Court reaffirmed its commitment
to reliability as the pole star of the harmless error inquiry. In Neder v. United
States,1 7 7 the Court held that a trial judge's erroneous failure to submit the
materiality element to the jury was not structural error, and was instead subject to
harmless error analysis. The Neder Court rejected the defendant's argument that by
failing to instruct the jury on an element of the offense, the trial court in effect
deprived the defendant of the structural right to have a jury decide his guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. 
178
Now that Chapman has taught us that the inquiry is no longer "constitutional v.
non-constitutional errors," what factors drive the decision about whether a particu-
lar kind of error should be amenable to harmless error analysis? It seems to us that
there are two distinct, though related, principles: (1) is the error the kind of error
that will likely affect the reliability of the truth-finding process; and (2) is the
and was this error harmless? A slim five-Justice majority-White, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens and Scalia-held
that Mr. Fulminante's conviction was coerced. A different five-Justice majority-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Souter and Scalia-held that the coerced confession error was not structural error and was thus subject to
harmless error analysis. Yet another five-Justice majority-White, Marshall, Brennan, Stevens, and Kennedy-
held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless.
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, vigorously dissented on the structural error
issue:
The search for truth is indeed central to our system of justice, but "certain constitutional rights are
not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important
values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial [citation omitted]." The right of a
defendant not to have his coerced confession used against him is among those rights, for using a
coerced confession "abort[s] the basic trial process" and "render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair
[citation omitted]."
499 U.S. at 295 (White, J., dissenting).
176. See, e.g., Ogletree, supra note 138, at 161-75; Stacy, supra note 159, at 1382-83; John Paul Stevens, The
Bill of Rights: A Century ofProgress, 59 U. CHI L. REv. 13, 16 n.9 (1992); see also Martha A. Field, Assessing the
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 15, 27-28
(1976) (criticizing Chapman); Mause, supra note 155, at 527-37 (same). Many of the critics of Chapman and
Fulminante level their criticisms at the unworkability of the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" test. See, e.g.,
Field, supra, at 15-16, 58-59; Stacy, supra 159. Others address the same problem but in a deeper jurisprudential
context: do we really want appellate courts guessing about what hypothetical verdicts hypothetical juries would
have returned if the trial had been hypothetically error-free? See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, But
Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167 (1995); Gregory Mitchell,
Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1335
(1994). Both of these sets of objections, even if valid, overstate the mark because they apply with equal force to
non-constitutional and constitutional harmless error. That is, once we accept the notion that not all error requires
reversal, we are necessarily forced to address the admittedly difficult question how to separate reversible from
non-reversible error.
177. 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
178. Id. at 26-27; Also note Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997), a plain error case in which the
Court, in dictum, indicated it would not treat as structural error a trial court's erroneous failure to instruct the jury
on materiality in a perjury case. In an opinion from which only Justice Scalia dissented, the Court said, "[r]eversal
for error, regardless of its effect on the judgment, encourages litigants to abuse the judicial process and bestirs the
public to ridicule it." Id. at 470 (quoting TRAYNOR, supra note 138, at 50).
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truth-finding impact of the error incapable of rational assessment? In accordance
with the teachings of Chapman and Fulminante, both of these factors focus on the
error's effect on the truth-finding process, not on the abstract rights of the
defendant.
Only by asking both of these questions do we get to the heart of the proper
harmless error inquiry, and to the correct criteria for structural error. If an error is
the kind of error unlikely to affect the reliability of the trial outcome, then we need
not ask the second question about the difficulty of ferreting out its actual impact.
Such errors should be harmless despite the difficulty of assessing actual impact.
Indeed, many abjectly harmless errors are nevertheless resistant to any kind of
rational impact assessment.
On the other hand, if the error is the kind of error we think likely to affect the
reliability of the trial outcome, we will still subject the error to harmless error
analysis if we think its impact is capable of being quantified. Thus, in Fulminante,
even though all the Justices agreed that the admission of a coerced confession is
the kind of error likely to affect the reliability of the trial outcome, the majority
concluded that its impact, though great, could nevertheless be measured against
the other evidence in a case.
It is only when the error is likely to affect reliability and has effects incapable of
being measured, that we should label the error "structural" and reverse without any
harmless error inquiry.
The Court's now long-standing commitment to a reliability-based view of
harmless error has important implications for the jury selection errors that are the
subject of this article. That commitment to reliability supports our thesis that all of
these jury selection errors are harmless because they have, by definition, no
qualitative impact on the reliability of convictions, even though we might all agree
that the effects of any particular jury selection error are almost always impossible
to quantify. '79
D. Plain Error
Appellate courts use the term "plain error" not to describe errors that are
necessarily reversible, but rather to describe errors that an appellate court may
choose to review even though the defendant failed to object to the errors at trial. ' 8 0
We include this discussion of plain error because it bears on the Court's "no
waiver" prong of Martinez-Salazar.8'
Well settled principles of waiver, applied to the trial process, have yielded the
179. See infra text accompanying notes 202-04.
180. Even though we label errors as "plain" for very different reasons than we label errors as "structural," to
the extent both descriptions reflect a judgment about the effects the errors are likely to have on trial outcomes, the
two labels may, in the end, describe the same set of increasingly rare errors. See infra notes 184-93 and
accompanying text.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 52-55.
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common law rule that appellate courts will not generally consider trial errors if a
party failed to object during the trial to the procedure or ruling giving rise to the
claimed error. This rule-often called the "contemporaneous objection rule"-is
not only grounded in basic principles of waiver, it also reflects the sound
institutional policy that trial courts should be given an opportunity to correct their
own errors by having those errors pointed out by counsel. The contemporaneous
objection rule is codified in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), Federal
Rule of Evidence 104, and in similar rules in virtually every state.'
8 2
But the contemporaneous objection rule was never absolute. As early as 1896,
the Court recognized that if certain "plain error was committed in a matter so
absolutely vital to defendants," then the error could be reviewed on appeal even
though it had not been raised in the trial court.' 83 By focusing on errors "vital to
defendants," the Court's early plain error cases, like its later harmless error
cases, 184 appeared to be grounded on reliability: certain errors will be reviewed,
notwithstanding the lack of a trial objection, if those errors are likely to have had
an adverse impact on a defendant, that is, to have contributed to the conviction. 18
5
Indeed, Rule 52(b), which codified the common law of plain error, described those
errors that are reviewable despite the lack of a trial objection as not only being
"plain errors" but also "defects affecting substantial rights."'1 86 The phrase "substan-
tial rights" is identical to the phrase used in Rule 52(a) to describe harmless error,
reinforcing the notion that although these two inquiries are on their face very
different and deal with different portions of the process, plain error and structural
error may, at bottom, be two ways at looking at the same fundamental problem:
when will we reverse convictions without examining the effect the error had on the
trial outcome?187
The plain error doctrine has undergone an evolution that in many ways mimics
the evolution of harmless error. Just as the Orthodox English Rule focused the
harmless error inquiry on reliability, so too did the early plain error cases.' 88 Just as
the Exchequer Rule moved the harmless error inquiry away from reliability and
toward the protection of a defendant's rights for the sake of those rights, cases
182. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-404 (stating that error may not be predicated on a ruling admitting
evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected and a timely objection or motion to strike is made); MiNN.
R. EvlD. 103(a)(1) (same); N.C. R. EviD. 103(a)(1) (same); OHIo. R. EvID. 103 (A)(1) (same); OR. R. EvlD.
103(l)(a) (same); WASH. R. Evto. 103(a)(1) (same).
183. Wilborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658-59 (1896).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 159-69.
185. Jeffrey L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule-Clarifying Plain Error Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1066 (1994) (discussing early plain error
cases).
186. FED. R. CrtM. P. 52(b) ("Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed
although they were not brought to the attention of the court.") (emphasis added).
187. See supra note 180.
188. See also Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1905).
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beginning in the 1930s did the same for plain error. t 89 Just as Fulminante has taken
the harmless error inquiry full circle back to reliability, so too have the Court's
plain error cases. 190 Indeed, in United States v. Young, the Court stated that the
doctrine of plain error must be used "sparingly," because any unwarranted
expansion "would skew [Rule 52(b)'s] 'careful balancing of our need to encourage
all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our
insistence that obvious injustice be promptly redressed." ' "191
In United States v. Olano, the Court completed this evolution back to reliability
by articulating a three-part test for plain error: 1) there must be error; 2) the error
must be "plain" (that is, "obvious" or "clear"); and 3) the error must "affect
substantial rights.' 19 2 The Court described the third prong as requiring the
defendant to prove that the error "affected the outcome of the district court
proceedings."' 93 We cannot imagine a clearer articulation of the reliability stan-
dard. Errors are now "plain," just as errors are now "structural," not because they
trampled on a defendant's important rights, but rather because the trampling
affected the reliability of the conviction.
Currently, the small list of plain errors expressly approved by the Court includes
defense counsel's failure to make a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of
the prosecution's case,' 94 failure to object to a jury instruction that erroneously
requires the jury to presume malice, 195 and the failure to object to confusing
sentencing instructions in a death penalty case. 196 The much larger list of errors the
Court has held are not plain errors includes defense counsel's failure to object to
improper prosecutorial closing arguments, t 97 failure to object to the trial court's
189. In United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936), the Court added two additional considerations to
the reliability test: the "obviousness" of the error, and its impact on "the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings." Certainly the latter of these two considerations shifted the focus of the inquiry from the
reliability of a particular defendant's conviction to the impact on the process as a whole. Even the "obviousness"
of an error relates to external issues like public reputation; a myriad of obvious errors have no impact at all on trial
outcomes.
190. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982) (returning to the reliability standard by describing
the plain error inquiry as whether it would be a "miscarriage of justice" to decline to review an error to which
a defense lawyer had not objected at trial); see also United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (reiterating
the "miscarriage of justice" test). Neither Frady nor Young addressed the tension between the narrow re-
liability standards they expressed and the much broader "public reputation" consideration articulated in Atkinson,
270 U.S. at 160. That tension was not expressly addressed until United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736-37
(1993).
191. 470 U.S. at 15 (quoting Frady, 456 U.S. at 163).
192. 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). The Olano Court also made it clear that Rule 52(b) is permissive. That is,
even if error in a particular case satisfies the three-part test, the appellate court has discretion to decline to review
the error. Id. at 735.
193. Id. at 734.
194. Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 159; Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 221-22 (1905).
195. Frady, 456 U.S. at 166 (dictum).
196. Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 394-95 (1999) (dictum).
197. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 20 (1985).
14272001]
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW
order allowing two alternate jurors to be present during jury deliberations,198
failure to object to jury instructions in a perjury case that left out the element of
materiality,' 99 and the failure to object to the exclusion of the defendant from an in
camera hearing during trial. 2"
As we discuss below, there is a long tradition of enforcing the contemporaneous
objection rule when it comes to jury selection errors; that is, jury selection errors
are rarely deemed to be plain errors. 201 Because the plain error inquiry is once
again an inquiry based on the reliability of the process, these holdings are entirely
consistent with our contention that the sorts of jury selection errors analyzed in this
article seldom have any adverse impact on trial outcomes. Thus, they are not only
harmless but they should never even be reviewed if a defendant fails to object to
them or, more particularly in the case of curative peremptory challenges, if a
defendant fails to cure a cause error with an available peremptory challenge.
VI. THE PROBLEM OF THE CURATIVE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
Courts have had trouble with the problem of the curative peremptory challenge
because they have had trouble articulating the purpose of the peremptory challenge
and identifying its role in securing an impartial jury. It is a decidedly odd problem.
Defendants are constitutionally entitled to an impartial jury, but they are not
constitutionally entitled to peremptory challenges. The peremptory challenge is, in
the words of the Martinez-Salazar Court, "auxiliary" to a defendant's right to an
impartial jury.20 2 So exactly when does a denial of this auxiliary rule-based or
statute-based "right" to peremptory challenges rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, and a reversible violation at that?
As we suggest below, the judicial ambivalence on this issue reflects a deeper and
unarticulated ambivalence about peremptory challenges themselves.20 3 On the one
hand, if peremptory challenges have any constitutional significance at all, it must
be because they serve as a check on the trial court's erroneous rulings on
challenges for cause, and therefore act as a screen to increase the chances that
biased jurors will not sit. And yet the Court in Martinez-Salazar holds that a
defendant is not required under the federal rules to use peremptory challenges
curatively. On the other hand, if we concede that peremptory challenges really
have very little to do with the selection of an impartial jury, then errors that result
in a compromise of a defendant's "right" to peremptory challenges will almost
always be harmless. As discussed below, we believe the Court's most recent
decisions, first in Ross and now in Martinez-Salazar, portend an acknowledgment
198. Olano, 507 U.S. at 740-41.
199. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,470 (1997).
200. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 529 (1985).
201. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
202. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 301, 311 (2000).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 234-47.
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that peremptory challenge errors are by their very nature harmless precisely because they
do not have, and have never had, much to do with selecting impartial jurors.20 4
In addition to this underlying doctrinal ambivalence about the role of the
peremptory challenge, there is a more mundane, but just as important, factor that
has confused the law in this area. The problem of the curative peremptory
challenge can come up, and has come up, in a variety of different circumstances.
Courts have not been terribly good at recognizing, let alone distinguishing, these
different circumstances.
We suggest there are four variables to consider: (1) whether the error at issue
was the erroneous granting of a prosecution challenge for cause or the erroneous
denial of a defense challenge for cause;20 5 (2) whether, in the former case, the
prosecution exhausted its peremptory challenges; (3) whether, in the latter case,
the defendant exhausted his or her peremptory challenges; 20 6 and (4) whether,
again in the latter case, the defendant peremptorily excused the very juror who
should have been excused for cause. These four variables in turn generate the
following six scenarios:
Scenario 1: The trial court erroneously grants a prosecution challenge for
cause, and the prosecution exhausts its peremptory challenges.
204. Id.
205. There are, of course, two additional possibilities: the erroneous denial of a prosecution challenge for
cause and the erroneous granting of a defense challenge for cause. But because these two errors devolve to the
benefit of the defendant, and because the prosecution in such circumstances may only have a limited right to an
advisory appeal in the event of an acquittal, we do not address them here. However, as post-Batson cases have
expanded the equal protection horizons to include a consideration of the rights of prospective jurors as well as
litigants, perhaps we should not be so quick to dispense with cause errors that favor a defendant but that still affect
the exercise of peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (extending Batson to
defense challenges as well as prosecution challenges); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991) (applying Batson
regardless of the race of the defendant or the race of the challenged juror). See generally Katherine Goldwasser,
Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry and the Jury in a Criminal Trial,
102 HARV. L. REv. 808 (1989); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection: Whose
Right Is It, Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725 (1992). The juror erroneously excused on the defendant's challenge
for cause suffers the same injury to his or her "right" to sit on the jury as the prospective juror in McCollum
peremptorily excused because of his race. Neither prospective juror is allowed to sit on the jury, and both should
sit. Somewhat more indirectly, the prospective juror excused with the prosecution's "extra" peremptory challenge,
after the trial court erroneously grants a prosecutorial challenge for cause, suffers an identical injury.
206. We do not consider, within variables two and three, the issue of when the peremptory challenges are
exhausted vis-a-vis the cause error. In the so-called "strike" method of exercising peremptory challenges, all
challenges for cause would have been raised and resolved before the beginning of the peremptory challenge
phase, so the defendant whose challenge for cause was erroneously denied will know before beginning
peremptory challenges that he or she may have to use a peremptory challenge curatively. See supra note 18. The
so-called "sequential" method puts the defendant in a substantially more delicate position. Since in this method
challenges for cause are interlaced with peremptory challenges, the defense may well have to make its decision
about whether to use a peremptory challenge curatively before it has any idea whether it will or will not end up
exhausting its peremptory challenges. Id. Indeed, in such a circumstance a defendant may have no peremptory
challenges left when the trial judge erroneously denies a defense challenge for cause. Although we are aware of no
cases that discuss this scenario, we concede that such an error-which results in the biased person actually sitting
on the jury-is probably structural error, for the same reasons the Court has labeled the presence of a biased judge
as structural error. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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Scenario 2: The trial court erroneously grants a prosecution challenge for
cause, but the prosecution does not exhaust its peremptory chal-
lenges.
Scenario 3: The trial court erroneously denies a defense challenge for cause, the
defendant exhausts all his or her peremptory challenges, and the
defendant uses one of the peremptory challenges on the errone-
ously retained juror.
Scenario 4: The trial court erroneously denies a defense challenge for cause, the
defendant exhausts his or her peremptory challenges, but the
defendant does not use one of the peremptory challenges on the
erroneously retained juror.
Scenario 5: The trial court erroneously denies a defense challenge for cause, the
defendant does not exhaust his or her peremptory challenges, but
the defendant does use one of the peremptory challenges on the
erroneously retained juror.
Scenario 6: The trial court erroneously denies a defense challenge for cause, the
defendant does not exhaust his or her peremptory challenges, and
the defendant does not use one of the peremptory challenges on the
erroneously retained juror.
As we examine the issues of harmless error, structural error, waiver, and the
relationship between challenges for cause, peremptory challenges, juror impar-
tiality and due process, we believe it is important to distinguish these six
scenarios.
A. AN ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS 1, 2, 3 AND 5 AFTER
MARTINEZ-SALAZAR: HARMLESS ERROR, STRUCTURAL
ERROR OR NO ERROR ATALL?
Let us first address the Court's fiction that these kinds of errors are not
errors at all. There is some potency to the idea that an error, if cured,
is no longer error. But, of course, that is true only if the cure itself does
not inflict another kind of error. In each of these four scenarios the cause
error is cured, but the price is the loss, or relative loss, of a peremptory
challenge.
In Scenario 3, surely the defendant has been "deprived" of a peremptory
challenge when he or she is forced to use a peremptory challenge on a prospective
juror that the trial judge should have removed for cause. The palpable error is the
denial of the challenge for cause; the immediate effect is that the defense has one
fewer peremptory challenge than it otherwise should. This error is as much of an
"error," and the deprivation of the peremptory challenge as much of a "depriva-
tion," as when a trial judge simply decides to give the defendant one less
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peremptory than the rules or statutes provide.20 7
If Scenario 3 error is "error," then Scenario 1 error is also "error," because the
effect of both "errors" is an imbalance in peremptory challenges to the defendant's
detriment. It is the relative number of peremptory challenges that is important in
gauging a litigant's power to shape the jury. A defendant who retains a measly six
peremptory challenges in the face of a trial judge's wholly unfounded and
erroneous decision to give the prosecution 100 peremptory challenges has surely
suffered "error."
We concede that the question of whether Scenario 2 and 5 error is really "error"
is a marginally more complex inquiry. The Scenario 2 defendant must contend
with the argument that the prosecution did not really get an "extra" peremptory
challenge because it did not exhaust its peremptory challenges. Another way to
state this argument is that even had the trial court not erroneously granted the
prosecution's challenge for cause, the prosecution could still have removed that
juror with its unused peremptory challenge. This scenario is Gray v. Mississippi,
2 0 8
and the Court expressly, and we think quite correctly, rejected the prosecution's
"unexercised peremptory" argument.20 9
Scenario 5 error is the counterpoint to Scenario 3. There is no doubt that the
Scenario 5 defendant was deprived of a peremptory challenge by being forced to
use one on the erroneously retained juror. However, the argument is that such a
defendant is hardly in a position to complain about the loss because he or she did
not choose to exhaust the remaining peremptory challenges. This is an argument
about the effect of the error, not about whether there is reviewable error in the first
instance.
Notwithstanding that Scenario 1, 2, 3 and 5 errors are in fact "errors," we
nevertheless contend that the general rule in each of these four scenarios should be
that the jury selection error is harmless and that the convictions must be af-
firmed. 10 In each of these scenarios, no demonstrably biased prospective jurors
end up sitting on the jury, so none of the scenarios involves any violation of a
207. Whether the error is harmless is, of course, another matter entirely. The Martinez-Salazar and Ross
Courts were able to avoid the harmlessness question by engaging in the fiction that neither case involved any error
at all. See supra text accompanying notes 58-66.
208. 481 U.S. 648 (1978), discussed in supra text accompanying notes 16-26.
209. Id. at 665-66:
The practical result of adoption of this unexercised peremptory argument would be to insulate jury
selection error from meaningful appellate review. But simply stating during voir dire that the State
is prepared to exercise a peremptory challenge if the court denies its motion for cause, a prosecutor
could ensure that a reviewing court would consider any erroneous exclusion harmless.
Moreover, the "unexercised peremptory" argument in Scenario 2 is not really an argument about whether there
has been error, but instead is an argument that the error is harmless.
210. We say "general rule" because there may be unique circumstances in a particular case that might rise to
the level of a due process violation without regard to harmless error. For example, a trial judge might intentionally
and substantially interfere with a defendant's peremptory challenges. Justice Ginsburg acknowledged as much in
her majority opinion in Martinez-Salazar: "[W]e note what this case does not involve. It is not asserted that the
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defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment. In other words,
all the jurors who actually sit in a Scenario 1, 2, 3 or 5 case were properly passed
for cause.
The only effect of a Scenario 1, 2, 3 or 5 error is an imbalance in peremptory
challenges. 2 1' Is this really the kind of error, and really the kind of "right," that
justifies reversing otherwise perfectly valid convictions returned by perfectly
impartial jurors? The answer must be no. This error is not constitutional, is not
structural and is harmless by any measure of that inquiry.
Scenario 1, 2, 3, and 5 error is certainly not constitutional error. Because a
criminal defendant has no right to any peremptory challenges, it is difficult to
understand how an imbalance in peremptory challenges could rise to the level of
constitutional error. Legislatures and supreme courts could abolish all peremptory
challenges tomorrow without inflicting constitutional injury on criminal defen-
dants. They could probably even eliminate all defense peremptory challenges and
retain all prosecution peremptory challenges.212 A trial court's unintentional
elimination of a single defense peremptory challenge likewise inflicts no constitu-
tional injury.
Defendants nevertheless incant the mantra of due process in these cases, as they
often do when an error that has no palpable constitutional reverberations is
nevertheless generically claimed to have deprived them of the minimum process
required for a fair (that is, reliable) trial. But these incantations ring particularly
hollow in Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 5. We cannot imagine an error with less due process
implications than one that results in a defendant still being tried by an impartial
jury, in a trial containing all the procedural and evidentiary protections upon which
our system is built.
21 3
Moreover, since Chapman and Fulminante, it is also clear that Scenario 1, 2, 3
and 5 errors are not structural errors and are therefore subject to harmless error
trial court deliberately misapplied the law in order to force the defendants to use a peremptory challenge to correct
the court's error." 528 U.S. at 316; see also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 91 n.5 (1988).
211. We use the word "imbalance" to indicate a shift, in the prosecution's favor, in the allocation of peremptory
challenges established by statute or rule. But of course in non-capital felonies in the federal courts, and many state
courts, the number of peremptory challenges does not start out equal. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
Whether or not a particular scheme gives the prosecution and defense the same number of peremptory challenges,
Scenario 1, 2, 3 and 5 error results in a shift in the original allocation to defendant's detriment.
212. Clearly, states may constitutionally reduce defense peremptory challenges while retaining the level of
prosecution peremptory challenges. That is what virtually every state that now provides an equal number of
peremptory challenges has done, since the English and colonial practice was typically to give the defendant more
peremptory challenges than the prosecution. Whether a reduction to zero might offend due process has never been
tested. Modem proposals to reduce peremptory challenges have all been aimed at ending up with an equal, though
smaller, number of peremptory challenges for each side. See supra note 123. Of course, even though peremptory
challenges are not constitutionally required, a trial court could not dole them out in an unconstitutional manner.
213. It is particularly difficult to take seriously a due process challenge from a Scenario 5 defendant. In that
Scenario, though the cause error may have forced the defendant to expend a peremptory challenge, the loss didn't
matter at all because the Scenario 5 defendant never gets around to exhausting the remaining peremptory
challenges.
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review, even if by some stretch of the imagination we might label them "constitu-
tional" errors. An error is no longer structural just because it is constitutional error
or because it involves some other especially important right, or even just because
its impacts may be difficult to gauge. 214 The inquiry is reliability. How can it be
said that the reliability of a trial is likely to be compromised when a defendant
loses a single peremptory challenge, but when all the jurors who actually hear the
case are fair and impartial? It cannot. By any sensible measure of "structural
error," and certainly by the Court's increasingly strict measures, jury selection
error of this sort is not "structural."
This brings us to the harmless error inquiry. If ever there were a category of
errors that borders on "harmless as a matter of law," it is the errors in Scenarios 1,
2, 3 and 5. The juries in these Scenarios were vetted for cause, and all of them
were, by definition, fair and impartial. Yet they returned convictions. By any
measure of harmlessness, depriving a defendant of a single peremptory challenge
will surely be harmless in most if not all cases.
21 5
The uniqueness of jury selection errors is that by their very nature they offer no
resistance to the evidentiary or instructional counterweights we typically place on
the scales of harmlessness. Ordinarily, the harmless error inquiry requires an
appellate court to ask whether the same jury would have reached the same result
with different evidence or different instructions. However, under these scenarios,
an impartial jury has already determined, based on all the evidence and the
instructions of law, that the prosecution has proved defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury selection errors in Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 5 require
appellate courts to ask whether a different but equally impartial jury would have
reached the same result with the same evidence and the same instructions. The
very foundations upon which our system is built-that cases are decided based on
the law and the evidence, and not on the peccadilloes of the fact-finders-will
almost always require us to conclude that such errors are harmless.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 157-80.
215. Scenario 5 defendants must not only face the argument that the loss of one peremptory challenge is
harmless, they must also explain why they did not bother to exhaust the ones they had left. Scenario 5 represents
the paradigmatic "harmlessness as a matter of law" error. How can a defendant complain that the trial court's
cause error effectively reduced the defense peremptories from six to five, when the defendant does not even bother
to use all five?
We have tried to imagine a situation in which the state would be unable to convince an appellate court that
Scenario 1, 2, 3 or 5 error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, but have had difficulty doing so, apart from
situations where a trial judge is acting with demonstrable malice. See supra note 212. One could argue that the
sheer number of Scenario 1, 2, 3 or 5 errors might at some point cease to become harmless. For example, if a trial
judge erroneously denies six defense challenges for cause and thereby deprives a defendant of all of his or her
peremptory challenges, the due process Maginot Line might be said to have been crossed, even in the absence of
proof of malice. Even then, the error is probably harmless in the strict sense of the word. The error becomes
reversible because the trial judge's behavior was intolerable, not because the conclusion was unreliable.
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B. AN ANALYSIS OF SCENARIOS 4 AND 6 AFTER MARTINEZ-SALAZAR:
WAIVER, INVITED ERROR, AND THE COURT'S STRANGE INVITATION
Even though Martinez-Salazar was not a Scenario 4 or 6 case, the majority went
considerably out of its way, as discussed above, to hold that Federal Rule 24(b)
does not require a defendant to use peremptory challenges curatively.2 t6 Under this
view, Scenario 4 and 6 defendants can never be said to have waived the challenge
for cause argument by failing to cure the claimed error with a peremptory
challenge. As a result, what had once been relatively well-settled rules of waiver in
Scenarios 4 and 6 are now in great doubt, at least in the federal courts.
We contend that the Court in Martinez-Salazar was wrong in its "no waiver"
holding, and that under the most basic principles of waiver Scenario 4 and 6
defendants have waived the cause errors by failing to take advantage of the
opportunity to cure the errors with available peremptory challenges.21 7 This
position is not only compelled by the doctrines of waiver, plain error and invited
error, but the contrary position encourages defense lawyers to engage in the very
kinds of games playing that puts the trial system in public disrepute.
Scenario 4 and 6 defendants take Justice Ginsburg's advice and elect not to
peremptorily excuse a palpably biased juror. Instead, they keep that biased juror on
the jury, save the peremptory challenge for use on other prospective jurors, then try
to obtain a reversal on appeal on the ground that the juror was biased. The only
difference between Scenario 4 and 6 is that in the former the defendant ends up
exhausting all peremptory challenges and in the latter he or she does not. By
making this "hard choice," the Scenario 4 and 6 defendants suffer no imbalance in
peremptory challenges. The issue is a much more direct and traditional one: does
the defendant waive the cause error on appeal because he or she elected not to
peremptorily excuse the very juror whom the defendant later claims on appeal to
have been biased? Just asking the question makes the answer evident, but let us
analyze these two waiver scenarios a little more comprehensively.
We begin with the well-established principle that cause errors themselves are
not plain errors. That is, if a defense lawyer fails to challenge a juror for cause
during jury selection, the cause error is ordinarily waived on appeal.218 If a lawyer
216. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (describing the majority's reasoning in holding that Rule
24(b) does not mandate curative use of peremptory challenges).
217. Scenario 4 and 6 error may not be harmless, because in those Scenarios, unlike in Scenarios 1, 2, 3 and 5,
the erroneously retained biased juror actually ends up sitting on the jury. But, of course, he or she does so because
the defendant chooses not to use an available peremptory challenge to remove that juror: thus, the waiver.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Polichemi, 219 F.3d 698, 710-11 (7th Cir. 2000); Acklin v. State, 790 So. 2d
975,994 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Stokes, 638 S.W.2d 715,721-22 (Mo. 1982); Douglas v. State, 951 P.2d
651, 661 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 177-78 (Utah App. 1992). Similarly, and
although the Supreme Court has not expressly addressed the issue, most courts have held that a defendant waives
a Batson argument on appeal if the Batson objection is not made during jury selection. See, e.g., United States v.
Ford, 498 U.S. 411, 418-19 (1991) (dictum) (opining that "undoubtedly... a state court may adopt a general rule
that a Batson claim is untimely if it is raised for the first time on appeal, or after the jury is sworn, or before its
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waives a cause error by not making it during jury selection, we cannot understand
how that same lawyer preserves the error by making the challenge for cause,
having it erroneously denied, and then failing to remove the juror with an available
peremptory challenge. In both cases, the lawyer had the power to remove the
biased juror, elected not to do so, and now wants to complain about that election on
appeal.2 19
The salutary purposes of the contemporaneous objection rule are particularly
important in jury selection. We want to encourage the trial court's opportunities to
correct jury selection error for the very reason that we are at the beginning of the
whole process. There are obvious and enormous judicial economies in correcting
jury selection errors when they are made, rather than with an appeal and re-trial.
Moreover, the challenge for cause and Batson inquiries are intensely factual. The
last kind of system any of us should want is one in which appellate courts are either
forced to be the initial finders of fact on these issues or forced to reverse
convictions precisely because they do not want to be the initial fact finders. The
trial court judge is in a unique, indeed exclusive, position to make the factual calls
upon which these assertions of jury selection errors depend.22 0 Finally, although
members are selected"); United States v. Lopez, 147 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1998); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Buckmon,
652 A.2d 597, 602--04 (D.C. App. 1994); State v. Sutherland, 859 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Mo. App. 1993); State v.
Wilson, 868 P.2d 656, 661-62 (N.M. 1993).; State v. Ballew, 667 NE.2d 369, 370-79 (Ohio. 1996); Weddell v.
Weber, 604 N.W.2d 274, 277 (S.D. 2000).
219. Indeed, the failure to use an available peremptory challenge is in one very important sense even more
unforgivable than the failure to make a challenge for cause: a lawyer's power to remove a prospective juror
peremptorily is almost absolute; the power to remove a prospective juror for cause requires a cogent argument and
a receptive trial judge. Twenty-six states have held that a defendant waives any argument that the trial court
erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause by failing to use an available peremptory challenge to strike the
juror in question. Singleton v. State, 921 P.2d 636, 638 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996); Trotter v. State, 377 S.W.2d 14, 23
(Ark. 1964); People v. Ayala, 1 P.3d 3, 24-25 (Cal. 2000); Pentecost v. State, 545 So.2d 861, 863 n.1 (Fla. 1989);
State v. Mitchell, 660 P.2d 1336, 1344 (Idaho 1983); People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 271-72 (I1. 1985);
Vaughn v. State, 559 N.E.2d 610, 614 (Ind. 1990); State v. Hickock, 363 P.2d 541, 550 (Kan. 1961); State v.
Brown, 742 So. 2d 1051, 1054-55 (La. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Pelletier, 434 A.2d 52, 55 (Me. 1981); Booth v.
State, 507 A.2d 1098, 1105 (Md. 1980); People v. Legrone, 517 N.W.2d 270,273 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Davis v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 724 So. 2d 907, 911 (Miss. 1998); Howard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d
862, 867-68 (Neb. 1993); Gibbons v. State, 634 P.2d 1214, 1215 (Nev. 1981); People v. Isaac, 622 N.Y.S.2d 587,
588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); State v. Johnson, 347 N.E.2d 7, 16-17 (N.C. 1986); State v. Stallings, 731 N.E.2d 159,
170 (Ohio 2000); Young v. State, 12 P.3d 20, 32-33 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000); State v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or.
Ct. App. 1983); State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300, 309-10 (R.I. 1973); State v. Bittner, 359 N.W.2d 121, 127 (S.D.
1989); Sommersville v. State, 521 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tenn. 1975); Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 3-4 (Tex. App.
1997); State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503, 510 (Utah 1997); Lattrell v. Swain, 239 A.2d 195, 198 (Vt. 1968). Only
Missouri has held that a defendant does not waive the cause error by failing to remove the juror with an available
peremptory challenge. State v. Taylor, 602 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
220. The standard of review for rulings on challenges for cause is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038-39 (1984) (noting that "special deference" is given to trial judge's
decision); State v. Esposito, 613 A.2d 242, 248-49 (Conn. 1992) (same). Similarly, review of Batson step three
(whether the proffered constitutionally neutral reason is a pretext) is subject to a clearly erroneous standard of
review. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 365 (1991) ("great deference"); United States v. Blackman, 66
F3d 1572, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1995) ("clearly erroneous"). Even Batson step one (whether the objector has made out
a prima facie case of discrimination) is reviewed in many circuits under a clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g.,
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challenges for cause and Batson challenges are not always easy decisions for trial
judges, once a decision favorable to the challenger is made the corrective action is
easy. Challenges for cause are granted and the challenged jurors removed; Baston
challenges are sustained and either the wrongfully excused juror returned to the
221jury or a new venire brought in.
The point is that there are many powerful institutional reasons for having these
issues raised early, raised before the judge who is in the best position to rule on
them, and corrected early. The same arguments apply to Scenario 4 and 6 errors.
The defendant is in a position to correct the trial judge's cause error early and
easily, simply by using an available peremptory challenge to strike the problem
juror. That corrective action is far superior, by any legitimate institutional measure,
to letting the biased juror sit through an entire trial and then reversing the
conviction and ordering a new trial.
Even without analogy to these two other kinds of non-plain jury selection errors,
Scenario 4 and 6 error is precisely the kind of error that has no bearing on
reliability and thus could never join the increasingly exclusive club of plain errors.
Indeed, these kinds of errors are not only not plain errors, they are a special
category of self-induced errors--often called "invited errors"-that appellate
courts have traditionally been loath to entertain. Some of the most obvious
examples of invited errors include: a party offering evidence at trial and having it
admitted, then objecting to its admission on appeal; 222 a party successfully keeping
out evidence at trial by way of a motion in limine, then objecting on appeal to its
exclusion;223 a party successfully resisting the other side's motion to recuse the
trial judge, then arguing on appeal that the judge was biased;22 4 a defendant
successfully requesting a particular jury instruction, then objecting to the giving of
United States v. Bergodere, 40 F.3d 512, 516 (lst Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1055 (1995); United States v.
Casper, 956 E2d 416, 418 (3d Cir. 1992). But see Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1998) (de novo
review of step 1); State v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 443 (2d Cir. 1989) (same).
221. There are two possible remedies when a trial judge concludes that a party has violated Batson by
exercising its peremptory challenges in a constitutionally impermissible manner: re-seat the peremptorily
excused jurors or start over with a new panel. Although most appellate opinions have expressed a preference for
the latter, see, e.g., State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1993), State v. Walker, 453 N.W.2d 127 (Wis. 1990),
the decisions in those cases may depend very much on the particular mechanics of jury selection. In cases where
the peremptory challenges are exercised by the so-called "strike" method, see supra note 18, and where the
lawyers do not announce their peremptory challenges in open court but rather indicate them on paper, there is no
reason the peremptorily struck jurors-who never knew they were struck-cannot be unstruck. See Brian J. Serr
& Mark Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Jurisprudence of a Delicate
Balance, 79 J. CIM. L. & CRIMMOLOGY, 1, 61 n.322 (1988). Of course, even bringing a new panel in and starting
jury selection over is much preferable to never giving the trial judge a chance to rule on the Batson error, going
through an entire trial, reversing the conviction on appeal and re-trying the case.
222. See, e.g., Wactor v. Spartan Trans. Corp., 27 F.3d 348, 350 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Reyes-
Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pina, 844 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1988).
223. See, e.g., American Life & Cas. Co. v. Oceanic Trade Alliance Council, Inc., 756 F.2d 474, 479-80 (6th
Cir. 1985).
224. See, e.g., First Colonial Corp. of Am. v. Am. Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re First Colonial Corp. of Am.), 693
F.2d 447,449-50 n.5 (5th Cir. 1987).
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that instruction on appeal;225 a defendant stipulating to an element of the offense (a
prior conviction), then objecting on appeal that the trial court instructed the jury
that that element had been stipulated.226 Less obvious examples include a defen-
dant "opening the door" to otherwise inadmissible evidence or improper argu-
ment.227
Scenario 4 and 6 errors are the kind of invited jury selection errors that appellate
courts should not review. Defendants in these scenarios had a straightforward and
easily exercised opportunity to prevent biased jurors from sitting on their juries,
yet they chose not to take that opportunity. Their choice may have been a "hard
choice," but it should not be without consequences.228 By electing not to remove
biased jurors peremptorily, defendants participate in their seating every bit as
much as the trial judges who erroneously fail to remove them for cause. Appellate
courts should not entertain these self-induced errors.
VII. RETHINKING THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES AND RELIABILITY
The problem of curative peremptory challenges forces us to come to grips with a
fundamental question: what is the purpose of peremptory challenges? The manner
in which the Martinez-Salazar Court resolved the problem suggests the Court is on
225. See, e.g., United States v. Thurman, 417 F2d 752, 753 (D.C. Cir 1969).
226. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 110 F3d 936, 944-48 (2d Cir. 1997). This result is not to be confused
with the principle that in the absence of such a stipulation a trial court may not direct a verdict, even as to a single
element, or with the principle that once a defendant stipulates to an element a trial court may not allow the
prosecution to put on evidence about it. See supra note 174.
227. See, e.g., State v. Stuard, 863 P.2d 881, 892-93 (Ariz. 1993); State v. Massey, 730 A.2d 623, 631 (Vt.
1999). Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted the invited error doctrine, although it is
mentioned in many cases in dictum. See, e.g., Kemp v. Potts, 475 U.S. 1068, 1071 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 337 (1985); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958). The
majority in United States v. Young expressed particular skepticism about the use of the doctrine in cases involving
prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments: "In retrospect, perhaps the idea of "invited response" has evolved
in a way not contemplated. Lawn and the earlier cases cited above should not be read as suggesting judicial
approval or - encouragement - of response-in-kind that inevitably exacerbates the tensions inherent in the
adversary process." 470 U.S. at 12; see also Albert W. Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prosecutors and Trial
Judges, 50 TEx. L. REv. 629, 657-58 (1972) (contending that courts generally regard invited error as an excuse for
a "free for all"). The Court has refused to apply the invited error doctrine to preclude it from reviewing an error
invited in the trial court, but addressed by the court of appeals. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997).
228. The Scenario 6 defendant does not face any choice, "hard" or otherwise. He or she is flush with
peremptory challenges, yet still decides not to use them to remove the very juror whom he or she unsuccessfully
argued is biased and should be removed for cause. Of course, the distinction between Scenario 5 and Scenario 6
will often not occur until the end of the jury selection process. If the peremptory challenges are exercised by the
so-called "sequential" method, see supra note 18, then defendants who elect not to use their very first peremptory
challenge on the biased juror do not know whether they will end up exhausting their peremptory challenges. That
is, the "hard" choice at this stage is whether defendants should trade the chance to remove a palpably biased juror
for the chance to stockpile peremptory challenges to be used against jurors with hidden biases or jurors the lawyer
simply does not like. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 63-65, this is not a hard choice at all, either
professionally or ethically.
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the brink of abandoning the myth that peremptory challenges help to achieve
impartial juries. That abandonment could be the long-predicted beginning of the
end of peremptory challenges.
Some judges and commentators have argued that peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional because they violate equal protection 2 2 9 due process 230 and the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair cross-section. 2 1 The counter-arguments
have always centered on the value of peremptory challenges as a tool to insure
impartial juries. 232 If in fact peremptory challenges have little or nothing to do with
the goal of selecting impartial jurors, which is what we think Martinez-Salazar
229. Justice Marshall made this argument in his famous concurrence in Batson, in which he suggested that no
amount of judicial tinkering will save defendants and jurors from the discriminatory power of peremptory
challenges, and that the only constitutional solution is to get rid of peremptory challenges entirely:
The decision today will not end the racial discrimination that peremptories inject into the
jury-selection process. That goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges
entirely.
The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by permitting the
exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban them entirely from the
criminal justice system.
Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-103, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); see also People v. Bolling, 591
N.E.2d 1136, 1145-46 (Bellacosa, J., concurring); Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should
be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369, 416-23 (1992). See generally Robert L. Harris, Jr., Redefining the Harm of
Peremptory Challenges, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1027, 1034-39 (1991); William T. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky:
Curing the Disease and Killing the Patient, 1987 S. CT. REv. 97, 123-56 (1987).
230. The due process argument is that the state cannot allow lawyers to engage in an irrational procedure that
the state could not itself impose. As Professor Alschuler so cogently put it:
Imagine a statute that generalized the principle underlying any specific use of a peremptory
challenge to exclude a prospective juror who could not be disqualified for cause. This statute might
disqualify from jury service both people who smile at defense attorneys and people who smile at
prosecutors, or it might disqualify from a jury anyone with a child the same age as the defendant
and anyone with a child the same age as the complaining witness. Although the line drawn by this
statute might be less offensive than many of the lines lawyers draw in exercising their peremptory
challenges, it probably could not survive constitutional scrutiny.... The peremptory challenge is
no better and may often be worse.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges and the Review of Jury
Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 153, 204 (1989); see also Note, Due Process Limits on Prosecutorial Peremptory
Challenges, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1013, 1014 (1989) ("[P]rosecutorial challenges, as potentially arbitrary and
capricious government action, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."). This due process
argument is particularly powerful because it is not dependent on uneasiness about Batson, and in fact gains
strength from many post-Batson cases relaxing (some would say eliminating) the state action requirement. See,
e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 47-49 (1992) (applying Batson to defense challenges as well as
prosecution challenges).
231. See, e.g., Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Challenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tx. L.
REv. 1041, 1128-36 (1995); see also Hoffman, supra note 110, at 867-68 (arguing that because of the small
number of jurors and large number of peremptory challenges, lawyers can eliminate entire identifiable groups
from the fair cross-section).
232. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REv. 545,
552-54 (1975).
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may actually mean, then they will not likely survive constitutional attack.233
The role of peremptory challenges, and in particular their connection with the
goal of selecting impartial jurors, has been rather unclear ever since juror
impartiality became fixed in the common law in the fifteenth century.234 Indeed,
the very fact that peremptory challenges antedated the notion of juror impartiality
by some 200 years should tell us something about whether juror impartiality and
peremptory challenges have much to do with one another.235 Blackstone's famous
and oft-quoted description of the peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that
tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English laws are justly
famous, ' 2 36 was coupled with a preceding, less famous and seldom quoted
description of it "as arbitrary and capricious. 237
We inherited this English ambivalence about peremptory challenges, as weil as
the English proclivity only to articulate their sunny side. Ever since it acknowl-
edged in Stilson that peremptory challenges are not constitutionally required, 38
the Court has consistently spoken about them in reverential, almost constitutional,
terms. The irony about these descriptions in dicta is that they have always been
coupled with non-dicta limitations on peremptory challenges, either on their
discriminatory exercise or on the effect they are deemed to have on trial outcomes.
Thus, in Swain v. Alabama, the majority describes the peremptory challenge as
having "very old credentials" and as "a necessary part of trial by jury, 23 ' but then
holds for the first time that peremptory challenges are not entirely peremptory, and
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits prosecutors from systematically using
them in a racially discriminatory fashion. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court repeats
233. We recognize that critics of the peremptory challenge have been predicting its demise for decades,
buoyed with each extension of Batson. See, e.g., Karen M. Bray, Reaching the Final Chapter in the Story of
Peremptory Challenges, 40 UCLA L. REv. 517 (1992); James J. Gobert, The Peremptory Challenge-An
Obituary, 1989 C~iM. L. REv. 528; Brian E. Leach, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Gender and Beyond: The
Death Knell for the Peremptory Challenge?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 381 (1995); Angela J. Mason, Discrimination
Based on Religious Affiliation: Another Nail in Peremptory Challenge's Coffin?, 29 GA. L. REv. 493 (1995);
Patricia F. Kaufman, The Beginning of the End of Peremptory Challenges: Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348
(1992), 16 HARv. J.L. & Pu. POL'Y 287 (1993); Edmund L. Quatmann, Jr., J.E.B. v. Alabama: The Extension of
the Equal Protection Clause to Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges-Is This the End?, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1349 (1995); Brian Wilson, Batson v. Kentucky: Can the "New" Peremptory Challenge Survive the Resurrection
of Strauder v. West Virginia?, 20 AKRON L. REv. 355 (1986). We suggest that if the Court ever does decide that
peremptory challenges are unconstitutional, it may not be with the bang of a final irrational extension of Batson,
but rather with the whimper of recognition that peremptory challenges do not advance the goal of juror
impartiality.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 68-77.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 97-110.
236. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at *346. Among the courts quoting this portion of Blackstone's description
was the Supreme Court in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 242 (1965).
237. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 71, at *346.
238. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919), discussed in supra text accompanying note 114.
239. 380 U.S. at 219.
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Swain's refrain in extolling the virtues of the peremptory challenge, 240 but then
holds that peremptory challenges cannot be used discriminatorily in the single case
at hand, whether or not the prosecutor has a history of systematically using them
discriminatorily. In all the post-Batson cases, the Court continues to pay homage to
the role of peremptory challenges, but then continues to extend Batson s encroach-
ment into the "peremptoriness" of peremptories.2" ! In Ross v. Oklahoma, the Court
again describes peremptory challenges as a way to ensure an impartial jury, yet
holds that their impairment is not only not reversible error but not error at all.
It is not until Martinez-Salazar that the Court begins to talk about peremptory
challenges with language that suggests they may not be as important to the
re-emerging paradigm of reliability as earlier cases had assumed:
We have long recognized the role of the peremptory challenge in reinforcing a
defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury. But we have long recognized,
as well, that such challenges are auxiliary; unlike the right to an impartial jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, peremptory challenges are not of federal
constitutional dimension.
24 2
Perhaps we read too much into the tea leaves of the Court's language, but we
detect a distinct and rather remarkable change in the way the Court has expressed
its long-standing ambiguity about the peremptory challenge. What in the days of
Swain and Batson was described as an important tool to ensure jury impartiality, in
whose constriction the Court only reluctantly participated to protect more
important rights of equal protection, is in the post-Martinez-Salazar world an
anachronism of common law whose abject violation is not even recognized as
error.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Jury selection errors whose only impact is a net reduction in peremptory
challenges are harmless. When a criminal defendant uses a peremptory challenge
to remove a prospective juror whom the trial court should have removed for cause,
the defendant is using peremptory challenges in precisely the curative manner for
which they were intended. If the defendant in such circumstances is convicted, he
or she is convicted by a fair and impartial, albeit different, jury, and the conviction
should be affirmed.243 If the defendant in such circumstances elects not to expend a
240. "[T]he peremptory challenge occupies an important position in our trial procedures." 476 U.S. 79, 98
(1986).
241. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to gender); Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991) (extending Batson to civil cases).
242. United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 311 (2000) (citations omitted).
243. As we discuss at length in analyzing all the scenarios, the same harmlessness conclusion applies when the
imbalance is the product of the trial court erroneously granting a prosecutor's challenge for cause. See supra text
accompanying notes 209-12.
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peremptory challenge on the erroneously retained juror, then that defendant should
not be allowed to raise the cause error on appeal.
Martinez-Salazar comes as close as the Court has ever come to talking about
peremptory challenges in the language of harmless error. We hope it will continue
to do so, and that it will continue its commitment to reliability as the pole star of
harmlessness. We hope the Court will re-think its "no waiver" holding, and return
to well-settled principles of waiver and non-plain error that are entirely consistent
with the reliability paradigm. Whatever it does in the future, the Court seems
finally to be talking about peremptory challenges in a more realistic, less romanti-
cized, way. That is good news for a system that needs less games playing in jury
selection and more common sense on appeal.

